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and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia
& Herzegovina
WILLIAM W. BURKE-WHfTE*

International criminal tribunals are often criticized
for having minimal inj1uence on the states over which
they exercise jurisdiction. This article argues that the
International Crimina! Tribuna! for the Former Yugoslavia has had a far more positive impact on domestic
governance in Bosnia & Herzegovina than previous~v
assumed by both the academic and policy communities. The article develops a theoretical model to explain the impact of international criminal tribunals on
domestic governance and tests that model against the
ICTf's inj1uence in Bosnia. More specifically, the article advances the claim that the nature of the tribunal 's jurisdictional relationship with domestic judicial
institutions and the incentives for national and international officials created by that jurisdiction interacted with changing preferences of domestic actors,
thereby catalyzing judicial reform and institutional
development in Bosnia. Based on an in-depth study of
the ICTf's interactions with Bosnia fron'l 1994 to
2006, the article presents new empirical evidence of
the Tribunal's early effect of.freezing out the activa* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. JD, Harvard Law School; PhD, Cambridge University. The author wishes to thank Marc Weller,
Philippe Sands, Philip Allot, Mark Drumbl, Colleen Burke, Jenia Tumer, the participants in
the University of Connecticut Intemational Law Roundtable (Winter 2006), and the participants in the Intcmational Criminal Coun Seminar Series (July 2006) who read or commented on earlier drafts. In addition, the author is grateful to all those in Bosnia & Herzegovina who assisted with the research, particularly Michael Johnson, and to the Penn Law
Faculty Research Fund for financial support.
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tion of the domestic judicimy in Bosnia and its later
role in the establishment of the new State Court of
Bosnia & Herzegovina with war crimes jurisdiction.
The article attributes the variance in the Tribunal's
influence over time in large part to changes in its jurisdictional relationship with national courts brought
about by the ICTY's Completion Strategy. The article
filrther suggests the significance of a tribunal's institutional design, and particularly its jurisdictional relationship, for the direction and intensity of its influence on domestic institutional development.
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TTRODUCTION

A variety of justifications for the establishment of
intemational criminal tribunals have been advanced, ranging from
retribution against criminal perpetrators to the restorative impact
criminal trials can have on affected communities. I Despite these
assumed benefits, international criminal tribunals, particularly ad hoc
tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), have been thought to have relatively little impact
on domestic reconstruction efforts or the reform of national
judiciaries. To the limited extent that such tribunals have been
perceived as influencing domestic governance, they have often been
criticized for either diverting aid away from judicial reform 2 or
eliminating the need for national judicial development by providing
an alternative forum for prosecution. 3 Even the UN Expel1 Group,
which reviewed the ICTY's operation in 1999, expressed concern at
the Tribunal's lack of engagement with the states under its
jurisdiction and failure to improve judicial capacity in the Ba1kans. 4

I. For a discussion of the justifications of using international criminal tribunals to
punish intemational crimes, see MARK DRl'MBL, ATROCITY, PUNTSHME"IT At"D
INTERNATIONAL LA W 59-70, 149-180 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes oj States/Crimes 0(" Hate: Lessons From
Rwanda, 24 YALE 1. I IT'L L. 365, 414 (1999) (noting that "[c]ven if one concedes that present Rwandan procedures for trying perpetrators are fundamentally flawed, it is appropriate
to ask whether enough attention and resources have been devoted, intemationally, to assisting local Rwandan processes as have been to the creation and ongoing efforts of the ICTR.
What would have been the state of Rwandan justice today if, instead of spending between
forty and fifty million dollars a year on the ICTR, comparable sums of money and eff0l1 had
becn put into assisting the Rwandan government in overcoming the en0l1110US obstacles it
faced in the pursuit of criminal accountability'?").
3. Julian Ku & Jide IzeJibe, Do InternaTional Criminal Tribunals DeTer or Ewcerbate Humanitarian Atrocities? 44 (Hofstra U. Sch. L. Legal Stud. Res. Series, Res. Paper
TO. 06-22,2007) (noting that intel11ational tribunals "will often cnable politicians in weak
states to escape accountability and avoid making hard policy decisions in the context of a
crisis").
4. For a report examining some of the ICTY's early failures, see Expel1 Group, ReporT o(the Expert Group to Conduct a Review 0(" the EffeCTive OperaTion ond Functioning 0("
the Internotional Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunalfor R\\'anda, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999). For a critique of the inability of the
IntemationaJ Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to enhance capacity there, see generally Alvarez, supra note 2.
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These critiques of the ICTY are, in part, correct. For much of
its first decade of operation, the ICTY did little to promote domestic
development or to enhance the capacity of national judicial institutions in the region. In fact, the ICTY may well have frozen out judicial reform in Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) in the years immediately
following the war in the Balkans. Since approximately 2002, however, the ICTY's impact on domestic institutions has been much
more positive. During this later period, the ICTY has encouraged the
development of domestic courts in BiH and catalyzed the activation
of domestic judicial institutions. Specifically, the ICTY has helped
spur the establishment of the new State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina (CBiH) with war crimes jurisdiction. This more nuanced reading of the ICTY's role in Bosnia suggests that the Tribunal's domestic impact has changed considerably over time and that its overall
contribution to domestic development has been far more positive
than has been assumed to date.
A key change in the functioning of the ICTY and its domestic
impact between the first period of its operation (1993-2002, when it
froze out domestic judicial development) and the second period
(2002-present, when it catalyzed the activation of national instituric'ns in BiH), was the advent of the Tribunal's Completion Strategy
in 2002. The Completion Strategy, developed in response to pressure
['rom donor states to wrap up the work of the Tribunal, shifted the
IC TY's jurisdictional relationship with domestic institutions in BiH
~ll1lL in turn, altered the incentives facing key officials within the Tribunal and in the Bosnian government. These new incentive structures allowed the Tribunal to move from inhibiting domestic judicial
Jcvelopment to facilitating nascent domestic demands for a stronger
national judiciary.
This article advances both a narrow claim that challenges
conventional understandings of the ICTY's impact in BiH and a
broader claim that the jurisdictional relationships between domestic
and international tribunals are a critical factor in the ability of an intem.ational tribunal to influence domestic governance. With respect
to the narrower claim, the 3liicle asserts that the ICTY has had a far
more positive impact on domestic governance and judicial development, particularly with respect to war crimes prosecutions, in BiH after 2002 than previously assumed by the academic and policy communities.
More specifically, the article contends that the
jurisdictional relationship between the ICTY and domestic courts
created incentives that structured the changing interests of domestic
actors to alter their policy choices in favor of judicial reform and institutional development in BiH. Based on an in-depth study of the
ICTY's interactions with Bosnia from 1994 to 2006, the article pre-
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sents new empirical evidence of the Tribunal's early effect of freezing out the activation of the domestic judiciary in Bosnia and its later
role in encouraging the establishment of the State Court of Bosnia &
Herzegovina. 5
The article's broader claim-generalized from the case study
of the ICTY in BiH-is that the institutional design of an intemational criminal tribunal, and particularly its jurisdictional relationship
with national courts, plays a key role in detennining the direction and
intensity of its influence on domestic institutional development. The
article explains the variance in the ICTY's domestic impact over time
based on two key variables: changes in domestic interests in Bosnia
& Herzegovina over time and alterations in the ICTY's jurisdictional
relationship with national courts brought about by its Completion
Strategy. While the first of these variables-changes in domestic interests over time-is hardly surprising, the second variable--the role
of a tribunal's jurisdictional relationship with national courts in structuring its domestic impact-is heretofore unexplored. This aI1icle,
therefore, develops and applies a theoretical model to explain how
changes in the jurisdictional relationship of an international criminal
tribunal can directly influence core policy choices of a national government.
Although some of the impacts of international criminal tribunals, such as their deterrent effect, have been subject to considerable
theoretical analysis, largely through analogies with their domestic
counterparts,6 the impact of international criminal tribunals on domestic judicial development has not been the subject of significant
5. The argument presented here is based on an in-depth evaluation of the interactions
between the ICTY and Bosnia & Herzegovina. The primary data analyzed herein derive
from documentary analysis and more than fifty interviews conducted in 2005 and 2006 in
Sarajevo and Mostar, Bosnia & Herzogovina, The Hague, Netherlands, and New York. N.Y.
with government officials, national judicial personnel, international legal officials, and both
local and international NGOs. The interview findings were supplemented and cOlToborated
with key documents made available by Bosnian govemmental institutions, the lCTY, the
United Nations, and various GOs. For a discussion of the basic techniques used in qualitative interview analysis, see Jody Miller and Brian Glassner, The "Inside" am! {he "OU{side": Finding realities in interviews, in QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, THEORY, METHOD AND
PRACTICE 99-111 (David Silverman cd., 1997); Janice M. Morse, "Emerging Fom {he
Data ": The Cognitive Processes of Ana(vsis in Qualita{ive Inquily, in CRITICAL ISSUES I"J
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 23, 35 (Janice M. Morse ed., 1994).
6. For domestic legal analogies, see JOHA, NES A DENiES, PUNISHMENT AND
DETERRENCE (1974) (providing a traditional account of the logic of criminal detelTencc);
DETERRENCE A?'JD 1 'CAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON
CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin eds., 1978) (examining
how punishments impact criminal behavior). For an application to the work of the ICTY.
see Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can Internationa! Crimina! Justice Deter Future
Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 12 (2001) (observing that "the threat of punishment may
persuade potential perpetrators to adjust their behavior"); Jan Klabbers, JUSl Revenge! The
Deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law, XII FIN. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 251 (200 I).
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theoretical enquiry and largely lacks domestic analogies on which
such enquiry could draw. This atiicle fills that theoretical gap by offering a micro-foundational account of how an international criminal
tribunal can influence significant domestic governance choices, such
as the decision to undeliake national judicial reform. The model developed here is rooted in institutionalist theories of international relations and comparative politics. It recognizes that international tribunals, even those only empowered to enforce international criminal
law against individuals, can monitor, sanction and provide benefits
directly to national governments through the jurisdictional design and
policy choices of the tribunal. This account is largely functionalist in
nature and emphasizes the ways in which the jurisdictional relationship between the international tribunal and national courts can alter
the incentives facing domestic actors and, thereby, influence domestic policy outcomes.
The theoretical model and empirical evidence for the ICTY's
intluence on governance in Bosnia advanced here not only challenge
conventional wisdom about the ICTY's record, but also suggest new
possibilities for international criminal tribunals to influence states.
Beyond simply monitoring state behavior, 7 international institutions
can playa direct role in "shaping or influencing political outcomes
\\ithin sovereign states in accordance with international legal rules"
hy strengthening domestic government, backstopping national 1nstiutions, and compelling domestic action. 8 While these functions have
iung been evident in the operation of international institutions of a
more general nature, such as the European Union, this study suggests
that even international criminal tribunals that have jurisdiction only
uver individuals-not states-can strengthen, backstop, and compel
domestic governance. This potential, highlighted by the interactions
L>ctween the ICTY and BiH, provides an opening for international
lawyers and diplomats to enhance post-conflict reconstruction or improve domestic governance through strategic choices in the design
and operation of international institutions, especially the jurisdictional mandate of intemational criminal tribunals. 9
7. For discussions ofthc role of international institutions in monitoring state behavior.
see RORERT KEOHAI"E, AFTER HEGEMO, Y: COOPERATION AND DrSCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL FeOt OMY (1984); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The
Rational Design of International Institutions, 54 [NT'L ORG. 76[ (2001); Andrew Kydd &
Duncan Snidal, Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of1nternational Regimes. i/1 REGIME
THEORY AND INTERl\i/\TfONAL RELAT[ONS [ 12 (Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer cds., 1993).
8. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke- White, The Future of International Law is
Domestic (or the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327-29 (2006).
9. For a discussion of the design of international institutions, sec the rangc of anicles
contained in TilE Ri\TIO\lAL DESIGN OF INTERNATrONAI. [NSTITUTrONS (Barbara Korcmemos.
Charles Lipsoll & Duncan Snidal cds .. 2003).
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The article begins with a brief introduction to the historical,
political and institutional context of the ICTY's interactions with BiH
that considers changes in the structure and use of the Bosnian judiciary to prosecute war crimes cases. As this paper attributes those
changes in large part to alterations in the jurisdictional mandate and
policies of the ICTY and changing domestic interests over time, Part
II develops a theoretical model for how an international criminal tribunal, such as the ICTY, can impact the behavior of national governments beyond detelTing inten1ational crimes. That theoretical account is essentially a rational choice model based on the nature of the
jurisdictional relationship between the international tribunal and national institutions and the preferences of domestic actors. Part III applies that model, examining in detail the impact of the ICTY on Bosnia & Herzegovina during two key phases of the Tribunal's
operation. During the first phase, from 1993 to 2002, the ICTY generated a strong chilling effect on domestic prosecutions and largely
prevented domestic juridical reform. In contrast, during the second
phase, from the advent of the ICTY's Completion Strategy in 2002
until present, the Tribunal has catalyzed the activity of the domestic
judiciary in Bosnia, including the establishment the State Court of
Bosnia & Herzegovina with war crimes jurisdiction. Finally, the
Conclusion examines the implications of jurisdictional design
choices on the domestic impact of international criminal tribunals
and suggests that the experiences of the ICTY may offer valuable
guidance for design and policy choices of newer tribunals such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
II.

FRAMING THE CASE: THE CONTEXT OF THE ICTY's
RELATJONSHIP WITH BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

Throughout the 1990s, a brutal and violent ethnic and political conflict raged in the Balkans. lo From 1992 to 1995, Bosnia
found itself at the center of a war among the emergent states of the
former Yugoslavia marked by significant international crimes by all
sides, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Hostilities largely came to an end in 1995 with the Dayton Peace
Conference, after which a general peace agreement was signed in

10. for a discussion of the history of Bosnia & Herzogovina. see MISIL\ GLENNY, THE
B/\LKANS:
N,'\TIONALISM, WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS 1804-1999 (2000); NorL
MALCOLM, Bost'IA: A SIIORT HISTORY (1994); MARK MAZOVvTR, THE BALKANS (2000);
LAURA SilBER & AU.AN L1TTLF., YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1997). lor a discussion of the plan and the process leading up to it. see DAVID OWEN. B!\IKr\N ODYSSEY (1995).
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Paris on 14 December 1995. 11 The agreement provided for a territorial settlement between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb
Republic as well as a new constitution for Bosnia & Herzegovina
with an international govell1mental mandate. 12
Under the ausgices of Dayton, an unusual constitutional structure was established, 3 providing for a federation of two entities, the
Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika
Srpska (RS),14 with most governmental authority at the level of the
two constituent entities and some powers reserved for the federal
1evd. 15 A three-person joint presidency includes one member from
each of the major ethnic groups. 16 A bicameral parliamentary assembly with ethnic representation has power over fiscal and other
matters. 17 Beyond these pennanent domestic institutions, the Dayton
:\(;cords also provided for the creation of the Office of the High Repr(sentative (OHR), an international organization in BiH with the "final authority" to interpret the Da~ton Agreement and the power to
impose legislation for the country. 8
In the years following Dayton, a Bosnian judiciary emerged
\\ith a complex structure. Under Dayton, judicial authority was
largely the responsibility of the FBiH and the RS. The FBiH consists
(If ten semi-independent cantons and the RS is comprised of five
-.;cparate administrative units. While there is a state level Ministry of
rustice, each of the RS entities and each of the FBiH cantons have
"lcir own independent justice ministry and court systems. 19 At the
11. For a discussion of Holbrooke's efforts, see RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR
( : LJ98).
12. For a discussion of the agreement, see id. For the agreement itself, see Office of
the: High Representative, Dayton Peace Agreement, The General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia & Herzogovina, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.- Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, available at
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/defauit.asp?contenUd=380.
For all relevant documents to the
Yugoslav crisis, see THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Daniel L. Bethlehem &
1arc Weller eds., 1997).
13. Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords includes the Constitution of Bosnia &
Herzogovina. The Constitution has never been passed through domestic parliamentary
channels but is the result of the international peace settlement.
14. See CONST. BOSN. & HERZ., annexed to the Dayton Peace Agreement, supra notc
12, annex 4, art. 1(3).
IS. See id. art. IIl( 1). Although the Dayton Agreements initially created a relatively
weak federal structure, retaining strong powers for the constituent entities, the Constitutional
Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina significantly expanded the powers of state level institutions
during its first term. Interview with David Feldman, Judge, Constitutional Court of Bosnia
& Herzogovina, in Cambridge, U.K. (Aug. 2, 2005).
16. See CONST. BOSN. & HERZ. 311. V.
17. See id. art IV.
18. See Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 12, annex X, art. V. The first holder of
the position was Carl Bildt of Sweden and the High Representative as of 2005 is Paddy Ashdown.
19. See War Crim!!s Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia & Her::.ogOl'ino.
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federal level, the Dayton Accords provided for a partially internationalized Constitutional Court with the power of judicial review.
Although express power was given to the federal government for "international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement,"20 no federal
judicial institutions other than the Constitutional Court were established. As a result, most law enforcement, including the domestic
prosecution of international crimes, was left to the constituent entities. 21
On 25 May 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, with primary jurisdiction over international crimes committed on the territory
of the Former Yugoslavia. 22 The ICTY's primary jurisdiction gave
the new Tribunal the authority to prosecute any cases it wanted to
and even to assume jurisdiction away from domestic courts. Endowed with significant international funding and a strong mandate
for accountability, the ICTY began the investigation and prosecution
of international crimes from the region, with much of its early efforts
focused on crimes in BiH. 23
In the first decade after Dayton, the Bosnian judiciary remained weak and judicial reform efforts were limited. Most significant prosecutions of international crimes from the war in Yugoslavia
were undertaken by the ICTY. Very few domestic prosecutions for
\Var crimes cases were initiated and, when they were, they were often
politically driven acts of reprisal rather than genuine attempts at accountability. While the decentralized structure of the Bosnian judiciary makes record keeping difficult, only fifty-four domestic war
crimes prosecutions were documented to have reached trial stage before January 2005. 24
Progress and Obstacles. Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe Report 3
In the FBiH and the RS, there is a multi-tiered coul1 system. Municipal courts in
the FBiH and Basic Courts in the RS are the cou11s of first instance. Cantonal courts in the
FBiH and District Courts in the RS are at the middle tier and Entity Constitutional COU!1S
provide final appellate review. lei at 85. Basic Courts in the RS have jurisdiction in criminal cases up to a maximum 20 year sentence and Cantonal courts in the FBiH have criminal
jurisdiction up to a 10 year sentencc. In addition, both entities have a series of minor offence courts outside the normal judiciary. lei
20. Dayton Peace Agreemcnt, supra note 12, al1s. III (2 )( c), lII(l )(g).
21. See id. art. VI; Interview with David Feldman, supra note IS. See also, Final Report of the Independent Judicial Commission 84 (March 2004) (on file with author) (observing that "[ m]ost matters, including the establishment and organization of the judicial system,
were made the responsibility of the two Entities").
22. See S.c. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
23. For an extensive treatment of the ICTY and its early work, see RACHEL KERR, THE

(2005).

[NTERNATIONAL CRIMIi\;\L TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND DrPLOMACY

(2004).

24. rVcrr Crimes Trials Before the Domestic
md Obsrucles, .l'ujJm note 19, at 5-6.

CO/ll'ls

ofBosnia & HerzogO\'ino. Progress
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Beginning in late 2002, however, judicial reform efforts in
Bosnia became far more prominent. In 2002, the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) engaged in a process of judicial streamlining
within the constituent entities, focusing on the number of courts, their
location, jurisdiction and ethnic balance. 25 A Judicial and Prosecutorial Service Commission evaluated judges, replaced many of them in
an effort to avoid bias and corruption, and significantly increased judicial salaries. 26 Efforts were also undertaken to improve court administration and management. 27 For example, the OHR led a set of
procedural reforms that basically moved BiH from the continental
civil law tradition toward an Anglo-American adversarial system. 28
The most notable reform effort has been the creation of a new
federal level criminal and administrative court, the State Court of
Bosnia & Herzegovina (CBiH). Between 2002 and 2004 the Bosnian
federal government established this new court of first instance at the
state level with jurisdiction over organized crimes, war crimes, and
crimes in the federal-as opposed to entity level-penal code. 29 This
new comi is now engaged in the active prosecution of war crimes
cases. In addition, the ICTY has now begun to refer cases it had int~nded to prosecute back to national institutions, particularly to the
25. See Fina! Report of the Independent Judicia! Commission, .wpro note 21, at 97.
')qe a!so Interview with John Peyton, Head of Legal Section, Office of the High RepresentaLve, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug. 5,2005). The number of municipal courts in FBiH
··;·as reduced from 53 to 28 and the number of Basic Courts in the RS was reduccd from 25
l<) 19. See Fina! Report 0/ the Independent Judicial Commission, supro notc 21, at 99. In
tile process, a number of courts were merged, some eliminated and othcrs expanded. See id.
~It 104. In addition, commercial divisions of the courts were established. As a result, thc
number of courts and judgcs was rcduced by 41 %, bringing the previously inflated Bosnian
judicial system closer in relative size to that of more developed Europcan neighbors. See
Fino! Repurr oJthe Independent Judicial Comrnission, supra note 21, at 95.
26. See Final Report a/the independent Judicial Commission, supra note 21, at 95. In
effect, all judges were fired and a select group rehired. Judicial salaries are now on the order
of €3.000 per month, among the highest paid professionals in the country. See Interview
with John Peyton, supro note 26. New legislation governing judicial budgets was also
passed. See Final Report o/the Independent Judicial Commission. supra note 21, at Ill.
27. See Final Report 0/ the independent Judicial Commission. slipra note 21, at I 17119. These effolts included the introduction of case management systems, increasing the
power of COUlt presidents to organize caseload, and changing the opening hours of courts.
28. See Final Report 0/ the Independent Judicial Commission, Sllpro note 21, at 16162. In short, "Some elements of the inquisitorial process were abandoned in favour of a
more adversarial process, with palties having the right to determine how their case will be
presented." lei. The French and German governments were strongly opposed to the changc.
See Intervicw with John Peyton, supra notc 26. Michael Bohlander. a Gem1an Judge and
former ICTY Senior Legal Advisor has referred to the change as "yet another example of
legal colonialism." Michael Bohlander, The Transfer o/Casesji'ol1l In/emotional Criminaf
Trihunals 10 National Courts 11 (working paper on file with author). It has not proved easy
for thc local judiciary to adapt. See Interview with RUPC11 Skilbeck, Head of aKa (Criminal Defense Service), in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug., 102005).
29 See War Crimes Chamber Project, Court of Bosnia & Hcrzogovina. Project 1111pfell/ell/utio/l Plan Progress Report (Oct. 20.2004) (on file vvith author).
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new State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina.
The overall record of the Bosnian judiciary since 1994 is contradictory. From 1993 to 2002, the domestic judiciary in Bosnia was
largely inactive, undertaking relatively few prosecutions of its own
and leaving most cases to the ICTY. Similarly, the Bosnian government invested relatively few resources in judicial reform efforts.
Toward the end of 2002, however, the Bosnian judiciary became far
more active, the CBiH was established, and numerous cases were returned from the ICTY to domestic courts. This variation in the effectiveness of Bosnian courts at prosecuting war crimes raises significant questions. First, what accounts for the changes in the Bosnian
judiciary beginning in late 2002? Based on considerable empirical
evidence presented below, this article suggests that the changing effectiveness of the Bosnian judiciary can be attributed both to pressure
from above, brought about by alterations in the rCTY's jurisdictional
mandate and policies under its Completion Strategy, and to pressure
from below, brought about by the shifting preferences of key domestic actors over time. To the extent that changes in the ICTY's jurisdiction and policies were a factor in the variance in the development
and use of the Bosnian judiciary, a second question arises: how can
an international criminal tribunal with jurisdiction only over individuals influence the operation of a domestic judiciary and the policy
choices of a national government? The following section develops a
functionalist model of how an international criminal tribunal can
have such deep influence on the domestic governance choices of
states. In so doing, it provides the theoretical foundation for explaining how the ICTY could influence the structure and operation of the
domestic judiciary in BiH.
III.

EXPLAINING THE DOMESTIC INFLUEJ CE OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

Despite the now voluminous literature on international criminal tribunals, their influence on domestic govenlance-as opposed to
on the individuals over whom they exercise jurisdiction-remains
largely under-theorized. As international criminal tribunals are a
functional subset of international institutions more generally, a theoretical account of their influence on domestic governance can be derived from the impact of international institutions on state behavior
more generally. In the political science and international relations
literature, inte111ational institutions have been shown to perfonn a
number of functions with respect to the behavior of their member
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states, including reducing transaction costs of cooperation,30 monitoring state behavior,31 sanctioning violations,32 generating lags 33 and
issue linkages,34 and even chan~ing state preferences through longerterm processes of socialization. 5 Each of these functions has the potential to impact state behavior in relation to the institution's particular legal rules and norms. The influence of international criminal tribunals on domestic governance choices ought to be linked to one or
more of these general institutional functions.
This Part of the article is organized into two sections: first,
section A explains the nature and scope of the influence wielded by
international criminal tribunals on state behavior; then section B presents a theory of how this influence arises by drawing on a functionalist analysis of the role played by international criminal tribunals in
multilevel systems of global governance. Ultimately, this Part argues
that the domestic influence of international criminal tribunals can
best be understood by viewing such tribunals as part of a deeply interconnected system of multilevel global governance.

A.

The Domestic Influence ofInternational Tribunals

Over the past two decades, perhaps the most important development in the role of intel11ational institutions has been the legalization of dispute resolution 36 through a proliferation of international
COUlis and tribunals. 37 Due to the function and stnlcture of intema30. See ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, POWER A)\D INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITICS IN TRANSlTlON (1977) (developing an institutionalist theory of international relations). KEOHANE, supra note 7, at 89~109.
31. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH I TER:'lATlONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22-24, 135-73 (1995).
32. See Downs George, David Rocke & Peter Barsoom, Is the Good News about Compliance Good News abollf Cooperation?, 50 I0IT'L ORG. 379-406 (1996).
33. INTER0I:'\TIONAL REGIMES 359-61 (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983); see also ANDREAS
HASENCLEVER, PETER MAYER & VOLKER RITTBERGER, THEORIES OF INTER;-":;\TIONAL
REGIMES (1997).
34. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 13,285-87 (1982) (discussing thc positive impact of linkages in the negotiation process); Keohane, Slipro note 7, at

91-93.
35. See generally ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1999). See also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, flo\\' to influence States: Sociali::otion and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Alastair [an Johnson. The Social
Effects of International institutions on Domestic (Foreign Policy) Actors, in LOCATING THE
PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE I 'TERACTI01\ OF DOMESTIC AND L TER 'ATIONAL It'STlTUTIO"iS
145 (Daniel W. Drezner cd., 2002); Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 181 (1996).
36. See generally LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 1-104 (Judith L. Goldstein,
Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2001).
37 See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, http://www.pict-pcti.org/.
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tional tribunals generally, and international criminal tribunals more
specifically, their ability to impact state behavior draws on a subset
of the more general mechanisms noted above through which international institutions influence state conduct. Some of the standard
mechanisms through which international institutions impact states are
inapplicable to international tribunals of any sort, due to their particular operation. For example, international courts are not designed to
help states identify and act upon common interests. Nor do international courts, in and of themselves, generate lags or issue linkages
that might alter state interests and behavior. 38
In contrast, international tribunals are well positioned to impact state behavior through other functions of institutional influence,
such as monitoring, imposing sanctions, and promoting norm socialization. International tribunals deepen the delegation of international
commitments. 39 They thereby increase the costs of defection from
underlying legal norms by monitoring state behavior and, where that
behavior breaches underlying legal rules, sanctioning i1. 4o Likewise
international tribunals can socialize states through iterative interactions with the court. 41
These mechanisms of influence available to international tribunals suggest that the main impact of such tribunals will be to increase compliance rates with the legal nOffilS the tribunal enforces.
Monitoring, sanctioning, and socializing essentially push and pull
states toward greater compliance with the legal regime the tribunal
enforces by making the costs of noncompliance greater than they
would have been absent the tribunal or by acculturating states into
the acceptance of new sets of norms and values. The overall result of
the establishment of an international tribunal to enforce a particular
set of substantive legal norms should, therefore, be to more effectively pressure states to comply with the underlying legal rules enforced by the tribuna1. 42
38. International cout1s might, however, be in a position to adjudicate violations of underlying substantive legal rules that could well generate lags or issue linkages. The WTO is
perhaps the best example thereof. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, international Organizations.
Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 324 (2006); Jose E. Alvarez, The BOllndaries o/Ihe
WTO. The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. I T'L L. 146 (2002).
39. Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 1-104.
40. See general(v Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, slipra note 32.
41. See genera!(v Goodman & Jinks, supra notc 35.
42. Even here, however, the record of intcrnational courts is somewhat mixcd. See
CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPUANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THI': INTERI !\ TIO. AL COURT OF
JUSTICE (2004) (tracing the record of state compliance with ICJ decisions). Except to the
degree that the underlying legal rules subject to the court's jurisdiction require some degree
of domestic political changc or transformation, the standard explanations for the domestic
impact of intcl11ational institutions on state behavior neither anticipate nor explain the in Ouence of intemational tribunals on domestic policy choiccs beyond enhancing compliance
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Drawing on this analysis, institutionalist theory would predict
that the primary impact of international criminal tribunals would be
to increase compliance rates with substantive norms of international
criminal law. International criminal tribunals are distinct from tribunals of more general jurisdiction in two ways, both of which reinforce this expected impact of such courts in increasing compliance
with international criminal law. First, intemational criminal tribunals
have jurisdiction over a very narrow set of substantive legal obligations, namely the irohibition of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. 4
As a result, their monitoring and sanctioning
should increase compliance rates largely with respect to these particular rules. Second, these tribunals have criminal jurisdiction over
individuals, not states. 44 Hence, their most immediate impact should
be to alter the incentives of particular individuals and, hopefully, deter individual commission of intemational crimes.
Given that intemational criminal tribunals have jurisdiction
over individuals and not states, the influence of such criminal tribunals on state behavior should be of a secondaty nature. When international criminal tribunals deter pat1icular individuals who happen to
be in control of state policy from engaging in some prohibited conduct, those officials may, in turn, alter state behavior to better conform to the substantive rules of international criminal law subject to
the tribunal's jurisdiction. Intemational criminal tribunals would
therefore be expected to have a particularly strong primary impact of
individual deterrence and a secondary influence of altering state behavior toward compliance with the substantive rules of international
criminal law. The standard theories of institutional impact do not,
however, explain how international criminal tribunals can have a
broader impact on domestic governance with respect to norms not directly within the international tribunal's jurisdiction, such as reforming or activating domestic judiciaries.

with underlying legal rules. For a more general discussion of intemational relations theories
and compliance with intemational law, see Anne-Marie Slaughter & Kal Raustiala. Inlernolionol LolV, International Relations, ond Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF I 'TERt'ATIO"lAL
RELAT10l\S 538 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002).
43. See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonm;r Yugoslavia,
May 25, 1993,32 I.LM. 1203; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Nov. 8,1994.33 I.L.M. 1598.
44. See. e.g.. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the F0ll11er Yugoslavia.
supro note 43; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. slIjJm note 43.
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A Multilevel Global Governance-based Theory ofthe
Domestic Influence ofInternational Criminal Tribunals

Although extant theories of the function and influence of international tribunals do not suggest that such tribunals would have
significant influence on domestic governance, beyond enhancing
compliance with the substantive norms they adjudicate, at least some
international tribunals have had deeper impacts on the domestic policy choices of states within their jurisdiction. Anne-Marie Slaughter
and Walter Mattli, for example, have offered an institutionalist theory
of the influence of the European Court of Justice (ECl) on the behavior of member states. They argue that the judges of the European
Court of Justice "managed to turn the Treaty of Rome... into a constitution," and thereby promote "the gradual penetration of EC law
into the law of its member states.,,45 Slaughter and Mattli offer a
neo-functionalist account46 of how the ECJ came to directly influence the states over which it exercises jurisdiction and, essentially,
shift the political center of gravity from the nation state to the regional leve1. 47
PaIi of the ECl's deeper political influence can be attributed
to the fact that the substantive norms it adjudicates involve key issues
of domestic policy and even the structure of domestic institutions.
Hence, the monitoring and sanctioning of that behavior by the EC]
could account for deeper influences on domestic governance consistent with the standard function of international tribunals. Slaughter
and Mattli's analysis, however, suggests that the judges of the ECl
were able to push beyond the legal norms articulated in the Treaty of
Rome and more fundamentally reshape the relationships between
domestic and regional governance. They assert that the ECl's farreaching influence stems from the Court's place in the broader process of European integration, in which actors above and below the
state looked to the Court in their own pursuit of instrumental selfinterest toward incremental expansion of integration. 48 In essence,
the ECl was situated within a system of multilevel global governance, through which actors and institutions at the regional and na45. Anne-Marie Burley (now Slaughter) & Walter Mattli, Europe Bejore the Court: A
Political TheolY of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41--43 (1993).
46. According to Ernst Haas, neofunctonalism addresses the way in which "political
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations,
and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions posses or demand
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." ERNST HAAS, THE STUDY OF REGIONAL
610 (1970).
Burley & Mattli, supra note 45, at 53. For a discussion ofneo-functionalism in the
context of European integration, sec generally ERNST HAAS, THI': UNlTfNG OF EUROPE ( 195~).
48. Burley & Maltli, supru note 45, at 53-56.
INTEGRATION
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tional levels could influence one another's policy choices in ways
that benefited the Court's own power and the Court could likewise
use the interests of those national and supranational actors to its
benefit. In Slaughter and Mattli's words, the ECl's development depended on the Court's interaction with a "specialized national and
supranational community.,,49
While the context of the ECJ is unique, Slaughter and Mattli's
neo-functionalist analysis of the Court's broader impact provides a
starting point for a theoretical account of the political influences of
international criminal tribunals beyond detelTing the crimes subject to
their jurisdiction. Just as the ECJ is situated within a multilevel governance structure-in that case comprised of domestic and European
institutions-so, too, are international criminal tribunals, such as the
ICTY, embedded in a broader, multilevel governance structure. Such
a structure of multilevel global governance consists of a number of
functionally distinct institutions at a range of levels of authority in international affairs operating in a deeply interconnected and mutually
reinforcing set of relationships with one another and with national
governments. so
As in the context of European integration, the structure of
multilevel global governance in which the ICTY is embedded involves sharing authority within particular functional domains between national and international institutions and shifting the loci of
power and authority over those functional domains. As James
Rosenau explains, in a global governance structure, order is achieved
not only through the coercive power of the state, but also through the
dispersion of authority in the international system and "the collective
capacity to identify and solve problems on a global scale."SI Within
such a system, a range of different parties-including states, international organizations, and non-state actors-have control over particular functions of governance. 52 Central to the operation of such multiJd. at 58.
50. For a discussion of global governance, see James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order,
and Change in World Politics, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMF. T: ORDER AND
CHA~GF IN WORLD POLITICS 1, 4 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
Elements of global governance thinking, can be found in the earlier writings of the English
School in political science. See HEDLEY BULL, THE A\!ARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF
WORLD POL.ITICS (1977). The growing scholarship in the field of global governance led to
the foundation of a new journal in the 1990s entitled GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, which has been
the focal point of writings on the topic.
51. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Everyday Global Governance, DfEDALUS, Winter 2003, at
In.
52. See generally DAvro HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE
MODFR;-": STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995) (considering the implications of
global governance on cosmopolitanism); ORAN YOUNG, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING
INSIGHTS fRO""t THE ENVIRON\;IFNTAL EXPERIENCE (1997) (examining the operation of global
49.
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level goven1ance, Rosenau asserts there are "major shifts in the location of authority and the site of control mechanisms ....,,53
International criminal tribunals such as the ICTY operate
within such a context of contestation over the levels of authority at
which certain governance functions should occur. In the case of international criminal tribunals, that contestation largely relates to the
appropriate level of governance at which criminal prosecutions
should be undertaken. When the UN Security Council established
the ICTY, it endowed it with primary criminal jurisdiction over the
states of the former Yugoslavia. In so doing, the Security Council
shifted the locus of authority over the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, traditionally a closely guarded element of domestic governance,54 up from the nation state to an international institution. Both
the ICTY and national courts came to share jurisdiction over international crimes, such that the choices made at one level of goven1ance
would have direct impact on the outcomes at the other level of governance. Actors at both the domestic and international levels could
use this contestation of jurisdictional authority to secure, enhance, or
expand their own powers and, in tum, influence policy choices at the
other levcl of governance.
This jurisdictional relationship created by the Security Council provided a powerful framework within which an international
criminal tribunal could impact the incentives of domestic actors, not
just with respect to the commission of international crimes, but also
with respect to the very stnlcture and organization of national government. Essentially, the contestation over the appropriate locus of
jurisdictional competence provided an international criminal tribunal,
which would nonnally only be able to influence individual behavior,
with direct leverage over state conduct and the operation of national
institutions. This jurisdictional relationship gives an international
criminal tribunal the power to monitor and sanction state behavior
through choices with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction in addition
to its ordinary influence on individual behavior through the application of criminal sanctions. As a result, the tribunal could influence
domestic policy outcomes far beyond merely enhancing individual
compliance with substantive rules of international criminal law.
govemance in intemational environmental affairs).
53. Rosenau, SlIpro note SO, at 153.
54. Historically, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction was largely left to the domestic
courts of the tenitorial state. As Vanel observed " ... the justice of each nation ought in
general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its o\<\'n territories ...." E.
DE VATTEl.. THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 1, ch. 19, § 233 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916)
(1758). For a general discussion of the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to crime, see
Drap CO/7ve/7tio/1 0/7 Jurisdictio/7 with Re.\peCl to Critne, 29 A\il. J. 1NT'L L. SL:P. 435 (1935)
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The multilevel global governance model, which is based on
the jurisdictional relationship between domestic and international
courts, provides the foundation for explaining the influences of international criminal tribunals. It offers a theoretical account of how international criminal tribunals can monitor, sanction, and grant benefits to actors and institutions at the domestic level of governance
beyond the simple adjudication of substantive international criminal
law. This account is rooted in three key elements: first, the jurisdictional relationships bctween international and domestic institutions;
second, the pursuit of rational self-interest by actors at both the domestic and international levels of governance; and, third, nonn leadcrship by international institutions. This model can explain both the
influence of the ICTY on domestic politics in Bil-I and the observed
\'ariance in that influence over time.
].

Jurisdiction and the Structure of Multilevel Global
Governance

The jurisdictional relationship between domestic and international tribunals defines the structure of the global governance system.
Jurisdictional relationships determine whether the international tribunal will be able to monitor domestic governance choices, sanction
them, or provide benefits to domestic actors directly, as opposed to
only through the adjudication of individual criminal violations. To
the extent that the jurisdictional relationship provides for such monitoring and sanctioning of governance choices, the international
criminal tribunal will influence those choices.
The design of the jurisdictional relationship and the choices
made by the international tribunal provide either sanctions or benefits
to a national government, thereby altering the incentives facing that
goven1ment. In so doing, international criminal tribunals still rely on
the basic monitoring and sanctioning functions of international institutions, but they monitor and sanction the performance of a domestic
judiciary or government, rather than just monitor and sanction criminal conduct through prosecution. The decision by an international
criminal tribunal to assume jurisdiction, for example, carries with it
costs and benefits for the domestic government. The structure of jurisdiction and the criteria on which choices to exercise that jurisdiction are made create incentives for domestic actors with respect to the
functions of national institutions. Those incentives, costs and benefits imposed directly on the domestic government can, in tum, influence domestic policy choices.
A variety of jurisdictional relationships between domestic and
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international tribunals are possible and each creates distinct incentives for domestic actors. Some jurisdictional relationships give an
international tribunal no authority to monitor, sanction, or grant benefits directly to a domestic government and, as a result, leave the tribunal with very limited influence over domestic goven1ance. Other
jurisdictional relationships give an international tribunal considerable
power to monitor and sanction domestic governance choices through
the structure of incentives created by the comparative jurisdictional
empowerment of the domestic and international courts.
Four jurisdictional relationships in particular deserve attention. First is a jurisdictional relationship of domestic primacy, according to which the international tribunal can only adjudicate if domestic authorities refer a case to it. A second possible relationship is
simple international primacy, under which a domestic tribunal can
only act when international courts do not do SO.55 A third relationship is absolute international primacy, according to which the international court must expressly approve any domestic exercise of jurisdiction.
A fourth possible jurisdictional relationship is
complementarity, in which international tribunals can only act where
domestic courts fail to undertake genuine prosecutions of their
own. 56 Each of these jurisdictional relationships creates distinct incentives for political actors and judicial officials at the domestic
level. These incentives can, in tum, channel self-interested action
toward changes in domestic governance. The incentive stmctures
created by each of these four jurisdictional relationships are considered in tum.
First, a jurisdictional relationship of absolute domestic primacy allows national actors to decide when and if they will exercise
jurisdiction or if, instead, they would rather pass that jurisdictional
entitlement to an international tribunal. This arrangement allows
domestic political actors to determine whether to endow their own
courts with the legal, political and financial means to undertake international criminal prosecutions. The international tribunal essentially sits donnant, waiting for domestic officials to give it the power
to prosecute. Since action by the international tribunal is fully dependent on a referral from domestic officials, the international tribunal is not in a position to monitor or sanction domestic decisions with
)) This is, essentially, the jurisdictional structure of the ICTY and ICTR. at least prior
to the Completion Strategy. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, .wpm note 43; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal lor R\vanda,
slIpm notc 43.
56. See Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,2187 lJ.\i.T.S. 3;
Mohamed L::I Leidy, The Principle oj' Complementarity: A Nell' A/ochinel:" to Ililplemelll
Inlemotiol7ol Crilllinol LoYI', 23 MIUI. J [\iT'! L 1169 (2002).
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respect to the exercise of jurisdiction. In fact, this jurisdictional relationship may provide incentives for domestic inaction that underlie
many of the criticisms of international criminal tribunals noted
above. By providing an alte1l1ative forum for prosecution that can be
activated at the whim of the domestic government, this jurisdictional
relationship offers a low cost alternative to the activation of national
courts, allowing domestic officials to punt politically challenging or
technically difficult cases on to an international forum. S7 As a result,
absolute domestic primacy may result in the underutilization of domestic institutions.
Second, a jurisdictional relationship of intemational primacy
limits domestic courts to the exercise of their jurisdiction only when
the international tribunal appears not to be pursuing a particular case,
though the international tribunal would retain the authority to remove
the case to the international forum at any point in the proceedings. 58
This jurisdictional relationship subordinates domestic actors to
choices at the intemationallevel of governance; their authority to exercise jurisdiction may be compromised at any time by international
policy decisions. In essence, this relationship imposes a sanction on
national officials in the form of the costs associated with an ongoing
potential for the assumption of jurisdiction by and removal of a case
to the international tribunal. Even where the international tribunal
does not actually assume jurisdiction, the uncertainty of whether it
will seek to remove the case imposes costs on domestic actors and
may provide a disincentive for investment in domestic infrastructure
or a particular investigation and prosecution since those efforts could
be undercut by the international tribunal's assertion of primacy. This
ability of the international tribunal to assume jurisdiction can function as a sanction on national governments, limiting their ability and
incentives to act. Such a sanction may have powerful consequences
where the international tribunal does not provide clear guidance as to
the types of cases or circumstances in which it will assume jurisdiction as domestic actors have no guidelines around which to structure
their own policy choices. The result of a jurisdictional relationship of
international primacy may be to create incentives for domestic political authorities not to provide the domestic judiciary with resources

57. In such a jurisdictional relationship, the critique of Ku and Nzelibe that international tribunals create perverse incentives for national actors may well be eon'ect. See Ku
and Nzelibe, supra note 3, at 42.
58. The lCTY exercised this form of absolute international primacy in a particularly
notorious way in the early Tadic case in which it essentially removed the case from German
courts to the international tribunal. See Prosecutor v. Tactic, Case No. IT-94-I-D, Decision
of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for DefelTal
(No\· R, 1994)
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for international criminal prosecutions, precisely because there is no
assurance that the international tribunal will not preempt the domestic judiciary's efforts.
A third jurisdictional relationship, absolute international primacy, requires an international tribunal or other supranational actor
to affirmatively grant domestic authorities jurisdictional competence
on a case-by-case basis. Such a structure is an extreme version of
simple international primacy, but further conditions the exercise of
domestic jurisdiction on an affirmative international authorization for
domestic prosecution. A jurisdictional relationship of absolute international primacy can provide two different sets of incentives for domestic actors. First, up until the international tribunal approves the
exercise of domestic jurisdiction, absolute international primacy provides a further disincentive for investment in or use of the national
judiciary because action by domestic institutions is fully conditioned
on international authorization. As in simple inteolational primacy,
the effect is often to impose an additional sanction on the domestic
exercise of jurisdiction in the form of the real costs of seeking international approval and the psychological costs for domestic officials
of subjugation to an international institution. Again, domestic authorities are hierarchically subjugated to international actors and,
therefore, have little or no incentive to enhance the capacity of domestic judicial institutions. These incentives may lead domestic authorities to "under-invest in the kinds of institutional refomls necessary" to promote an effective domestic judiciary.59 Once the
international tribunal has authorized the exercise of domestic jurisdiction, the relationship returns to something close to domestic primacy, in that domestic actors can decide to exercise jurisdiction
without the threat of removal by the international tribunal. The net
effect of absolute intelllational primacy will depend on how readily
and how quickly the international tribunal approves the exercise of
domestic jurisdiction in each case. A slow and costly process will
provide a strong disincentive for domestic authorities to seek approval and use their own courts. A rapid and efficient process may
provide less of a disincentive for domestic officials to undertake their
own prosecutions, but still results in a net chilling of domestic prosecutions.
A final jurisdictional relationship, complementarity, involves
a very different set of interactions between international and domestic institutions and provides perhaps the most powerful incentives for
the activation of a domestic judiciary. In a relationship of comple-

59.

Ku and Nzelibe. supra note 3. at 42.
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mentarity, an intel11ational tribunal can only assume jurisdiction
when domestic authorities fail to undertake genuine prosecutions
themselves. 60 Such a relationship puts national authorities in the first
mover position. They are able to make a first order determination of
whether they wish to exercise jurisdiction themselves. In the case of
complementarity, however, national authorities must make that determination with the knowledge that, should they fail to exercise jurisdiction, the international tribunal may intervene, thereby imposing
considerable sovereignty costs that stem from international intervention. Should the domestic prosecution lack genuineness at any point
in the proceedings, the international tribunal can intervene and assume jurisdiction itself, putting domestic officials on notice that the
conduct of their own proceedings will be monitored by international
actors and measured against a defined set of criteria, with intervention possible, should domestic proceedings not meet those standards. 61
In this relationship of complementarity, the international tribunal performs first and foremost a monitoring function, by evaluating whether the domestic forum meets certain benchmarks: namely,
whether a domestic investigation or prosecution was undertaken and,
if so, whether that prosecution met standards of fairness and effectiveness. Where the domestic forum meets these standards, the international tribunal essentially grants a benefit to domestic institutions,
allowing them to exercise jurisdiction with at least a tacit stamp of
international approval. In contrast, where the domestic forum does
not meet the standards, the international forum can assume jurisdiction, thereby imposing a sanction on domestic authorities in the form
of the sovereignty costs of international intervention.
Two different incentive structures may result from complementarity. To the extent that the political and financial costs of
prosecution for the domestic government are high and, particularly if
60. for a discussion of complementarity in the context of the Rome Statute of the ICC,
see Flavia Lattanzi, The International Criminal Court and Notional Jurisdictions, in THE
ROME STATUTE or TIlE I TERt\ATIOt\AL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLE GE TO IMPlJ 'ITY 177
(Mauro Politi & Giuseppe esi eds., 200 I); see also John T. Holmes, Complementarity.
Notional Courts \'ersus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTER AnONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (noting that "[i]ronically,
however, the provisions of the Rome Statute itself contemplate an institution that may never
be employed"); John T. Holmes, The Principle 0/ Complementarity, in THE INTERN ATIONAL
CRIMI 'AL COURT, THE MAKI G OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES, j TEGOTIAnONS, RESULTS 4 I
(Roy Lee ed., 1999).
61. This is not unlike the situation that faces inferior domestic judges in a national judicial system. Such judges know that their decisions are subject to review and reversal by
higher COU11S, should their decisions not meet requisite standards. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, A Cost!,\' Signaling Theon! o{"Hcml Look" Judicial Review, 58 ADMfN, L. REV. 753
(2006).
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the ultimate goal of domestic officials is to avoid any prosecution of
a particular case, domestic authorities may remain inactive, essentially defen-ing to an international tribunal in hopes, perhaps, that
such international tribunal will not ultimately exercise jurisdiction,
resulting in no prosecution. Similarly, in the face of high costs of
domestic prosecution, a national government may even actively refer
a case to an international tribunal so as to transfer those financial
costs to the international institution, even if it means assuming the
sovereignty costs of international intervention, precisely because the
political and financial costs of domestic prosecution would be even
greater than the sovereignty costs of international intervention.
The second potential incentive structure that flows from complementarity occurs where domestic actors detennine that the political costs of domestic prosecution are lower than the sovereignty costs
that would ensue from international intervention. 62 In such a case,
domestic officials will seck to exercise jurisdiction in national courts
in order to avoid the potential imposition of sovereignty costs that
would follow from the intervention by an international tribunal. The
calculation of such potential sovereignty costs from international
prosecution depends on a realistic threat of intell1ational intervention
in the case of a domestic failure to act. 63 Such a threat will be particularly poignant, and hence the perceived sovereignty costs exceptionally high, when an intcmational tribunal has already begun to investigate a particular situation or is tasked by, for example, the UN
Security Council with providing accountability for a pal1icular situation. As a result, complementarity will often create incentives for
domestic authorities to empower national judicial institutions to undertake genuine domestic prosecutions of international crimes and for
domestic judicial officials to exercise jurisdiction. By acting first
themselves, domestic actors are largely able to avoid the high sovereignty costs associated with intemational intervention and can reap
the benefits of tacit approval of their domestic proceedings by the international tribunal.

62. Here "sovereignty costs" is used to refcr to what Duncan Snidal and Kenneth Abbott call "the symbolic and material costs of diminished national autonomy." Kcnneth Abbott, Symposium on !vIethod in International Len\': International Relations Theon', International Law. and the Regime Goveming Atmcities in Intemotional Con/licts, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 361, 375 (1999).
63. While, in general, the threat of intervention by an international tribunal with a
complementarity jurisdictional relationships may be low, once such a tribunal has begun to
investigate a particular situation or is tasked with providing accountability in a given state,
then the threat of international intervcntion becomes high, increasing the perceived sovereignty costs of domcstic inaction and the potential for such a structural relationship to promote domcstic judicial development.
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Table 1: Jurisdictional Relationships and Incentives for Domestic
Judicial Empowerment
Jurisdictional
Relationship

Legal Powe.·
of
Jnternational
Tribunal

Influence of
International
Tribunal

Incentives
Created for
Domestic
Actors

Domestic
Impact

Domestic
Primacy

Prosecute only
if referral by
state

None

None or
excuse for
domestic
inaction

None or
inhibit
domestic
action

Ir~ lernational

Prosecute
when and if
international
officials want

Sanction domestic
government with
threat of
international
action

Deference to
international
forum due to
uncertainty of
international
intervention

Under
investment in
and under use
of domestic
judicial
institutions

Absolute
International
Primacy

Prosecute
when and if
international
officials want;
authorize
domestic
prosecutions

Sanction domestic
government
through costs of
international
approval

Absolute
deference to
international
forum

Extreme under
investment in
and under use
of domestic
judicial
institutions

Complementarity

International
intervention
only if
domestic
authorities fail
to undertake
genuIne
investigations
or prosecutions

Monitor; sanction
domestic
government
through
assumption of
jurisdiction in
case of domestic
failure; provide
benefit to
domestic
government
through tacit
approval of
domestic process

Activation of
domestic
judiciary
when
sovereignty
costs of
international
intervention
outweigh
political and
financial costs
of domestic
prosecution

Investment in
and
empowennent
of national
judicial
institutions;
domestic
judicial
officials more
likely to
exercIse
jurisdiction

Primacy
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The Pursuit of Individual Self-Interest

A second element of this model to explain the impact of international criminal tribunals on domestic governance is that actors at
both the national and international levels of the system pursue their
own self-interests. They are assumed to be rational actors who
evaluate the potential payoffs of various policies and choose the policy option that offers them the highest payoff. 64 They do so, however, with reference to the incentives created by the jurisdictional relationships discussed above. 65 Taking into account those incentives,
domestic and international actors will pursue their preferred policy
options and use the institutions at their disposal to fmiher their objectives. The particular preferences of those actors in light of the incentives created by the governance relationship will determine the policies pursued by actors at both levels of governance and, ultimately,
the international tribunal's domestic impact. The fact that the
broader influence of international tribunals on domestic governance
flows from the pursuit of self-interest by domestic and international
officials is significant because it means that such influence does not
depend on an international institution actively seeking to influence
domestic outcomes or on the altruistic behavior of government officials.
Concrete examples of the pursuit of individual self-interest
under two different sets of systemic incentives illustrate the processes
that underlie the domestic impact of an international criminal tribunal. Under a jurisdictional relationship of absolute international primacy, national courts can only exercise jurisdiction if expressly authorized to do so by the relevant international institution. Assuming
that domestic government officials are rational actors, their primary
interests could be assumed to be the promotion of their own careers
or, in an ideal world, the improvement of the effectiveness of domestic government. 66 Ordinarily, the domestic criminal judiciary is
among the levers of influence available to those officials to achieve

64. For an introduction to rational choice theory, see James M. Buchanan, Politics
Withollt Romance. A Sketch 0./ Positive Public Choice Them:]' and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11 (James M. Buchanan & Robet1 D. Tollison
cds., 1984). For a discussion and critique of such rational choice analysis, see DONALD P.
GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF
ApPUCATIONS II\' POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994).
65. See generalh' DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIOi\:AL CHANGE, Al\D
Eco OMIC PERFOIUv!ANCE (1990) (discussing how' institutions can create or alter the incentive strucnlfe in the economic context).
66. See generally PUBLIC DUTIES: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS or GOVERNMENT
OFlICIALS (Joel L. Fleishman et al. cds., (981) (discussing interests and duties of govemtncnt officials).
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their goals or govern the state. 67 In a jurisdictional relationship of
absolute international primacy, the domestic judiciary is fully dependent on external actors and, hence, it would be highly unlikely
that domestic officials could advance personally or enhance the effectiveness of government by either activating or championing the
judiciary. The sanction involved in requesting international permission to proceed with a case makes the judiciary an inefficient avenue
through which those officials could advance their own positions or
improve governance. In such a circumstance, there is little, if any,
incentive for the domestic officials to invest political capital or limited financial resources in the judiciary, as other pathways of influence not subject to international control would offer more promising
results. The jurisdictional relationship of absolute international primacy thus creates incentives for domestic officials who pursue their
own self-interest to channel resources away from the domestic judiciary. Such incentives may even prevent the development of judicial
capacity and institutional strength.
In contrast, if those same domestic officials pursue identical
self-interest in a governance structure of complementarity, outcomes
may be very different. If the domestic judiciary is empowered to
hear any criminal case it chooses, rather than being subjugated to international institutions, there is a much greater payoff for domestic
officials from investment, both political and financial, in the national
judiciary. Domestic officials might well find that championing the
domestic judiciary is politically beneficial and career enhancing.
Moreover, if domestic officials perceive a meaningful likelihood of
international intervention should the domestic judiciary be unable or
unwilling to genuinely prosecute a particular case, those officials
may seek to enhance the capacity and capability of the domestic judiciary so as to avoid the potentially high sovereignty costs of international intervention. In addition, officials might seek to enhance the
quality of the judiciary to reap the benefits of international approval
in the form of a decision by the international tribunal not to intervene. The rational pursuit of self-interest in a relationship of complementarity, particularly where an international tribunal is already
seized of the situation in a country and presents a meaningful threat
of imposing high sovereignty costs should domestic cOUlis fail to undetiake their own investigations and prosecutions, creates incentives
for greater investment in the domestic judiciary by national officials
and the political empowerment of domestic judicial institutions.
A second set of examples looks at the self-intercsted action of
67. Such influence need not come through controlling judicial outcomes. but rather
could be the result of political recognition from serving as a champion of the judiciary.
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international officials, again structured around the incentives created
by patiicular jurisdictional relationships. Take, for example, officials
within an international tribunal, such as the tribunal's prosecutors.
They can again be assumed to have a primary interest of promoting
their own careers as well as the success of the tribunal itself. 68 Success for such officials within an international organization will generally be determined by criteria externally defined, for example, by
the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC or the UN Security Council, which has ultimate responsibility for the operation of the ICTY.
For the ICTY, with jurisdictional primacy, that measure of success
has largely been effective international prosecution. 69 International
officials are, therefore, likely to devote their time and resources to
enhancing the ability of the international tribur~al to prosecute effectively and efficiently. International investment in, or assistance to,
domestic institutions will have no payoff since externally established
criteria of success firmly prioritize international prosecution. For international officials, the pursuit of self-interest within a structure of
international primacy is likely to have, at best, no impact on domestic
governance. In a worst case scenario, a governance structure of absolute international primacy could lead international officials, acting
in their own self-interest, to seek to limit domestic prosecutions that
could interfere with the work of the international tribuna1. 7o
In the context of a complementary jurisdictional relationship,
those same international officials will have very different incentives
as they pursue their own self-interest. These differences result from
both alterations in the criteria of success for tribunals of complementarity jurisdiction and from the complementary jurisdictional relationship itself. International tribunals with complementary jurisdiction may actually prioritize the effective functioning of a national
judiciary or, at least, the effective prosecution of international crimes
in any available forum. The ICC Prosecutor has explained with reference to the complementary jurisdiction of that tribunal: "As a con68. Most officials of an international tribunal remain for only a relatively shOit period
before moving on to other posts either in international institutions or within their own domestic governments. Such individuals will usually seek self-promotion, related to but independent from the ultimate success of the tribunal.
69. According to the UN Security Council when it established the ICTY, the Tribunal
had the "sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ten'itory of the former Yugoslavia sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia." S.c. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
( lay 25, 1993).
70. Domestic prosecutions could well interfere with the work of the international tribunal through, for example. compromising witnesses or due to the potential for double jeopardy if the domestic tribunal prosecuted an individual who the international tribunal subsequently chose to pursue.
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sequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the
Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the
absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular
functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.,,71
Hence, the self-interested goals of officials in a complementary international relationship may be to assist or empower domestic judiciaries to function more effectively.72
In addition to the altered perceptions of self-interest that accompany complementarity, the complementary jurisdictional relationship can give intel11ational officials a leverage point to promote
more effective domestic prosecutions by monitoring national conduct
and imposing sanctions on or providing benefits to national courts to
encourage domestic prosecutions. In the complementarity relationship then, international officials have strong incentives to engage in
active monitoring of domestic judicial activities, to intervene when
needed or to stand aside where genuine national prosecutions occur. 73 As a result, the self-interest and incentives that generally accompany a complementary jurisdictional relationship often promote
the empowerment and operation of domestic judicial institutions.
3.

Norm Leadership

The final element of this model that helps to explain the
broader impact of inteillational criminal tribunals on domestic governance is norm leadership. Institutions that operate within a common functional sphere of authority74 may provide norm leadership
for one another 75 because norms-"standard[sJ of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity,,76-can be espoused by institu71. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement made at the ceremony for the solemn undeJ1aking of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal COLll1 (June
16,2003) (available at http://www.iec-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/0306l6_moreno_ocampo_
english_final.pdf).
72. See generally William Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The inTerna-

tional Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System ofinrernational Justice, 49
HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (Winter 2008).
73. For a discussion of these leverage points, see generally id.
74. See generally Rosenau, supra note 50.
75. By turning to the role of norms in the third part of this model, the model simultaneously adopts a rational choice and a constructivist approach to explaining the influence of
international criminal tribunals. For a discussion of mixing rational choice and constructivist approaches, see generally MaJ1ha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887-88 (1998) (noting that "the current tendency to oppose norms against rationality or rational choice is not helpful in explaining
many of the most politically salient processes ... ").
76. See id. at 891; Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Norms,
fdentitv, and ClIlture in National Securitv, in THE CULTURE OF NATIO"lAL SECURITY 33-75
(Peter ~ Katzenstein ed .. 1996). For cliscu~sions of nonns in the legal literature. see ROBERT
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tions at one level of governance and adopted by those at another. As
institutions at the domestic and international levels of governance
undertake similar functions, they mat well look to one another for
ideas, innovations, and best practices. 7 As a result, domestic institutions may borrow from or adopt the policies and practices of their international counterparts, and vice versa, leading to changes in both
the structure and practices of institutions at both levels of governance.
The transmittal of domestic norms to the international level or
international norms into domestic governance often occurs through
the work of "norm entrepreneurs," who "attempt to convince a critical mass ... to embrace new norms.,,78 Within a global governance
structure in which domestic and international tribunals concurrently
exercise criminal jurisdiction, opportunities abound for norm entrepreneurs to borrow procedures, practices, and legal rules across governance levels and between institutions. This borrowing can, in tum,
result in changes to both the operation and functioning of the institutions of domestic and international governance, in this case, courts.
One potentially powerful means by which such norm leadership can occur is through the exchanges, dialogues, and meetings of
inter-judicial networks, which are growing in the context of international criminal law. 79 Anne-Marie Slaughter has extensively documented the 0teration of such networks in the context of constitutional courts 8 and the same kinds of interactions occur, perhaps with
even greater frequency, in the context of international and domestic
criminal tribunals. 81 Through such networks, ideas can be exchanged, best practices borrowed, and international norms socialized
into the policies and practices of domestic institutions. One clear example of such norm borrowing is the Bangalore Principles of Judicial

C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 246-54 (1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).
77. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 75, at 893 (noting that "many international
norms began as domestic norms" and that "international nornlS must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures"). While most of Finnemore & Sikkink's
argument looks at the move of nonns from domestic to international, the inverse is equally
possible.
78. Id. at 895.
79. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Netvvorks and International Criminal
Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007) (discussing the potential of transnational networks in
international criminal justice); see also Burke- White, supra note 72.
80. See A . E-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A EW WORLD ORDER 65~103 (2005) (discussing
judicial networks).
8t. In the area of international criminal law enforcement, for example, the ICTY has
organized a number of training sessions for judges, prosecutors, and judicial officials in
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Interview with David Tolbcl1, Deputy Prosecutor, lCTY. in
The Hague, :\Ieth. (July I. 2005).
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Conduct, which outline a set of best practices in judicial independence and have been highl~ influential in the practices of many developing country judiciaries. 2
Norm leadership can also be more formally embedded in the
jurisdictional relationships between international and domestic tribunals. For example, a jurisdictional relationship of complementarity,
in which the international tribunal can only intervene where national
institutions fail to undertake genuine prosecutions, may encourage
national actors to pursue genuine investigations and prosecutions of
their own. As the determination of whether a national frosecution
was, in fact, genuine rests with the international tribunal, 3 the international tribunal is in a position to lead norms for genuine prosecutions. To the degree that domestic actors find it in their own selfinterest to enhance the capacity and legitimacy of domestic institutions or have domestic proceedings recognized as "genuine", they
may seek to adopt and intcrnalize those international norms on which
the international tribunal will determine whether a domestic prosecution was, in fact, genuine. The international fonlm can provide a
benefit to domestic actors who adopt those norms by tacitly approving domestic proceedings or can sanction domestic actors who fail to
adopt those norms by imposing the sovereignty costs of international
intervention on them.
Overall, norm leadership provides for the transfer and exchange of policies and practices among judicial institutions at different levels of governance. These exchanges are motivated by the selfinterest of domestic and international actors and the incentives created by the jurisdictional relationship between domestic and international institutions.
4.

Summary

As the foregoing suggests, the incentives created by the jurisdictional relationships, the self-interested action of domestic and international actors, and norm leadership all allow international tribunals to exert profound influence on the policies and practices of the
institutions of domestic governance, particularly national judiciaries.
Whcreas previous models of the impact of international criminal tri-

82. See Report of Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International
Human Rights Nonns, Bangalore, India, reprinted in The Bongolore Principles on "the Domestic application of international human rights norms," 14 CI'v1MW. L. BULL. 1196 (1988).
For a discussion of their influence, sec Michael Kirby, International Loll': Impact on Narional Constitutions, 21 AM. U. [t--:T'L L. REV. 327, 332-45 (2006)
83. See, e.g.. Rome Statute of the International Crimina! COUl1 art. 17, 1998.
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bunals explain how those tribunals can enhance compliance with international criminal law or deter crimes, this model accounts for far
deeper influences of international tribunals on the very structure and
functioning of national institutions as well as for variations in those
influences over time. Pm1 III tests this model in the context of the relationship between the ICTY and the government of BiH.
IV.

TESTING THE MODEL: THE ICTY AND Bas IA &
HERZEGOVIl A

The model developed above begins to provide an answer to
the question raised at the end of Part I: How is it that an international
criminal tribunal with jurisdiction over individuals can influence fundamental policy choices of national governments, such as whether to
reform or activate national judicial institutions? More specifically,
the model suggests that jurisdictional relationships between international tribunals and domestic courts may allow international tribunals
to monitor and sanction domestic policy choices and thereby alter the
incentives facing domestic actors, which may in tum alter domestic
outcomes. The relationship between the ICTY and the institutions of
BiH offers an ideal example of the ways an international tribunal
embedded in a system of multilevel global governance can influence
domestic policy choices far beyond deterring international crimes.
While other factors, such as the growing domestic demand for a federal level judiciary in BiH, were necessary for the ultimate establishment of the State Court of BiH, the changing nature of the jurisdictional relationship between the ICTY and BiH shaped the
international tribunal's influence on domestic governance in BiH.
This Part of the article has three purposes. First, it tests the
model developed in Part II to explain the domestic impact of an international criminal tribunal through a detailed case study of the
ICTY's influence in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Second, it seeks to
demonstrate that the changes in the ICTY's jurisdictional relationship
and governance structure with BiH were critical factors in the reforms to and the greater activation of the Bosnian judiciary since late
2002. Finally, this third Part seeks to rebut critiques that the ICTY
has not had significant influence on domestic judicial development in
Bosnia, by tracing the Tribunal's role in the establishment of the new
State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina.
The ICTY's relationship with and influence on the institutions
of BiH can be best understood in two distinct phases, defined by the
jurisdictional relationship between the ICTY and domestic institutions. During the first phase, which ran essentially from the ICTY's
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establishment in 1993 until 2002, the ICTY had primary jurisdiction
and, at times, even absolute international primacy, over international
crimes committed in the Balkans. During this period, the ICTY imposed significant costs on the exercise of domestic jurisdiction,
thereby chilling the development of domestic judicial institutions in
BiH and the exercise of domestic criminal jurisdiction over war
crimes. A second phase, which began in late 2002 with the advent of
the ICTY's Completion Strategy, changed the jurisdictional relationship by allowing referral of cases back from the ICTY to domestic
courts. As a result, the ICTY was able to perform the kinds of monitoring and sanctioning of domestic institutions typically seen in a jurisdictional relationship of complementarity. This new jurisdictional
relationship combined with shifts in the interests of domestic and international actors, has driven the development of the domestic judiciary in BiH and, particularly, the establishment of the State Court of
Bosnia & Herzegovina.
A.

Phase 1: The ICTY's Chilling Effectfrom 1993-2002

During the first phase of the ICTY's interactions with BiH,
the structure of the jurisdictional relationship, the self-interest of key
actors, and the lack of norm leadership all contributed to a chilling of
domestic judicial reform and inhibited the activation of domestic judicial institutions. During this phase, which included the ICTY's establishment by the UN Security Council and its use of the Rules of
the Road program, sanctions imposed on BiH by the ICTY created
strong disincentives for investment in or activation of the BiH courts.
As a result, there was relatively little development of domestic judicial institutions between 1993 and 2002. From a normative perspective that embraces post-conflict reconstnlction and domestic rule of
law, the ICTY's influence during this period may well have been
counterproductive. Whatever the goals, however, the ICTY had a
considerable impact on the structure and functioning of the institutions of domestic governance in BiH, by freezing out the use of domestic courts.
1.

Jurisdictional Relationships: International Primacy and
Absolute International Primacy

The initial structure of the jurisdictional relationship between
the ICTY and the domestic courts of Bosnia & Herzegovina was detelmined by UN Security Council Resolution 827, which established
the rCTY and assigned it jurisdictional primacy over the domestic
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courts of the states of the former Yugoslavia. Pursuant to the resolution, the ICTY and the domestic courts of BiH have concurrent jurisdictional entitlements over crimes committed on the state's tCITitory,84 but the ICTY holds primary jurisdiction. Domestic courts
have a secondary jurisdiction and must defer to the ICTY upon request. 85
This jurisdictional relationship allows either domestic courts
or the international tribunal to prosecute international crimes committed on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. When national comis
exercise jurisdiction, however, the international forum may preempt
them on its own initiative. 86 Specifically, if proceedings within the
ICTY's jurisdiction are initiated in any state, the international prosecutor may re~uest information from that state as to the nature of the
proceedings. s Pursuant to Rule 9 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the prosecutor may then seek a Request for Deferral
from the trial chamber to prevent national proceedings from continuing. 88 According to the ICTY, the purpose of international primacy
was to prevent an accused from being able "to select the fonlm of his
choice, contrary to the principles relating to coercive criminal jurisdiction."89 In the test case of jurisdictional primacy, the ICTY asserted crrimary jurisdiction over the domestic comis of Germany in
1993,9 seeking the transfer of Dusko Tadic from Germany to the
ICTY. While Tadic challenged the Tribunal's primacy, both the
ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers upheld its primary jurisdictional
entitlement. 91
84.

Statute of the [nternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, annexed

to S.c. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,1993).
85. See id. art. 9.
86. For a discussion of jurisdictional primacy, see Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or
Complementarity' Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE It 'T'L L.J. 383,395--400 (1998).
87. See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 8, UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.40 (July
12, 2007) [hereinafter ICTY Rules], available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoceiindex.htm. Rule 8, unlike Rule 9 discussed below, specifically provides that compliance
with these requests is to be legally binding under article 29 of the Statute.
88. Id. at Rule 9. Rule 9 also provides certain guidance as to the ICTY 's assumption of
jurisdiction, which is appropriate if the acts are being prosecuted as an ordinary crime: if national proceedings lack impartiality; or if the acts are related to a case being investigated or
prosecuted by the Tribunal.
89. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, '141 (Aug. 10, 1995).
90. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 11'-94-1, Judgment (July 15, 1999).
91. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. [1'-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ~ 58 (Oct. 2, 1995) (observing: "Indeed. when an international tribunal such as the present one is created, it must be endowed with primacy over
national COUltS. Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would be a perennial danger
of international crimes being characterized as 'ordinary crimes' (Statute of the lntemational
Tribunal, art. 10, para. 2(a)), or proceedings being 'designed to shield the accLlsed,' or cases
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The jurisdictional relationship of primacy created strong disincentives for domestic prosecutions in BitT. Even if national courts
chose to initiate proceedings, the ICTY could assert primacy and preempt national action largely at will, as it did in the Tadic case. This
potential for intervention, particularly given the lack of any clear
standards for when the ICTY would intervene, effectively sanctioned
national officials seeking to exercise their own criminal jurisdiction.
Given the potential for ICTY intervention in any domestic war
crimes prosecution, national prosecutors were often reluctant to invest time and resources in cases that might well be removed to an international fonlm. As a result, the Tribunal narrowed "the opportunity for the development of additional mechanisms of justice, such as
domestic prosecutions and tluth commissions."92
In February 1996, the Rules of the Road Agreement, which
stipulated that the ICTY had to review case files from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia before domestic indictments could be
issued, essentially hardened the ICTY's jurisdictional relationship
with national governments into a form of absolute international primacy.93 Local judicial authorities were required to forward case files
to the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor for review and approval. Without such approval, domestic prosecutors would be unable to proceed
with the case. Though the intent of the Rules of the Road programto prevent politically motivated domestic prosecutions by one ethnic
group against another-may have been benign, the result was a further barrier to domestic prosecutions. 94 Again, the process of internot being diligently prosecuted (Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 10, para. 2(b))").
Although the ICTY's primacy was upheld, political statements from the Security Council
have, at times, sought to limit its application. See Brown, supra note 86, at 398-400. The
Russian, British, French, and American Security Council Members have, at times, all spoken
of a more limited role of primacy. See id
92. See Paul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, War Crimes Research Symposium: The Role
Of Justice In Building Peace: The Role Of Justice In The Former Yugoslavia: Antidote Or
Placebo For Coercive Appeasement?, 35 CASE W. RES. J.1. "T'L L. 219, 253 (2003).
93 See "Rules of the Road" provision of the Rome Agreement, Feb. 18, \996, as cited
in Mark S. Ellis, Bringing Justice to an Embalfled Region-Creating and implementing the
"Rules of the Road" for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. I, 7 (1999). The

agreement provided: "Persons, other than those already indicted by the International Tribunal, may be arrested and detained for serious violations of international humanitarian law
only pursuant to a previously issued order, wanant, or indictment that has been reviewed and
deemed consistent with international legal standards by the International Tribunal." ld.

94. See, e.g., Politics olRevenge in Bosnia's Una Sana Canton .)ystematically Violate
the Dayton accord, and International Low. Human Rights Watch, Aug. 8, 1997.

http://hrw.org/english/docsJI997/08/08/bosherI541.htm (discussing ethnically moti vated
detentions and prosecutions in Bosnia); see also Ellis, supra note 93, at 5 (noting an "intense
campaign to bring individuals suspected of cOlTunitting war crimes to justice. Each of the
three parties has maintained exhaustive, if not accurate, files on persons among the 'other'
group whom they ·know· to be war criminals"). See also vVar Crimes Trieds Before the
Domestic COllrts of Bosnia & Her:egol'ino, Progress and Ohsracles, supra note 19, at 5
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national review of domestic indictments sanctioned the exercise of
domestic jurisdiction sufficiently to deter national action.
Under the Rules of the Road Program the ICTY reviewed
files to determine if a serious violation of inte111ational humanitarian
law had occurred and, if so, whether the person accused was responsible for the crime. 95 In theory, the Tribunal would then categorize
each case file and return it to relevant national authorities. Cases
were marked as Category A if "the evidence [was] sufficient by international standards to provide reasonable grounds for the belief that
(accused's name) may have committed the (specified) serious violations of international humanitarian law.,,96 Category B was assigned
if evidence was insufficient, and Category C if the ICTY was unable
to determine the seriousness from available evidence. 97
The Rules of the Road program and the absolute international
primacy it created may have provided a check on biased domestic
prosecutions, but it also shifted the incentives of Bosnian prosecutors
and court officials away from national prosecutions or domestic judicial development. Though, technically, the ICTY reviewed cases
only in an advisory capacity, the High Representative interpreted the
review as legally binding on domestic prosecutors. 98 This interpretation transformed the advisory role of the ICTY into a legal bar on national adjudication, absent international approval. Moreover, even
when such international approval was sought, the ICTY was notoriously slow in reviewing cases, due in large part to staff limitations
and competing priorities. 99 In fact, more than 2,300 of just fewer
than 6,000 cases sent to the ICTY were never reviewed and were lost

noting the possibility of "arbitrary alTests and unfair trials").
95. See Procedures and Guidelines for Parties for the Submission of Cases to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia under the Agreed Measures of 18
February 1996 (on flle with author). [n making these determinations, the OTP accepts the
evidence as presented, draws all inferences in favor of national prosecution. and accepts the
reasonable hypotheses of the case. See Ellis, supm note 93, at 15.
96. War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts a/Bosnia & Her::egovina. Progress
and Obstacles, supra note 19, at 5.
97. ld.
98. In one case, for example, local authorities decided to proceed with a prosecution
despite a finding of insufticient evidence by the ICTY. See Ellis, supra note 93, at n.149.
At that point the High Representative issued a press statement noting that ·'the responsible
authorities breached their legal obligations to prosecute only those crimes where the Tribunal has found sufficient evidence under international standards." Memorandum from Peggy
L. Hicks, the Office of the High Representative. to CEELI (May 25, J 998), cited in Ellis.
wpm note 93, at n.151.
99. See Ellis, Sllpl'Cl note 93, at 19 (noting that "a shortage of resources left the Tribuna[
ill-equipped to review case files simply to determine whether or not they met the required
:videntiary standards"). The s!cl\v pace of the lCTY's review under the Rules of the Road
""-greement is an ongoing criticism in the Balkans. See Interview with Biljana Potparic-Lipa.
)resident, COLlrt of Bosnia & Herzogovilla. in Sarajevo. Bosl1. & Herz. (Aug. 9. 2005).
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in administrative limbo. 100
Moreover, the subjugation of domestic institutions limited the
payoff from investment in the judiciary for domestic officials. Since
domestic courts could only prosecute when inteillational approval
was given, the domestic judiciary could not become an effective, independent institution of governance nor could it be relied upon to
serve its fundamental purpose. In that context, it was far from an
ideal candidate to receive attention or resources from domestic officials.
The inteillational review procedure also increased the political costs of prosecutions for domestic judicial officials, who now had
to seek exteillal approval to issue indictments. Some Bosnian prosecutors noted the "loss of face" involved with having to request international approval and found the process "shameful."IOI The result,
according to observers, was that, "[f]or nearly five years, the 'Rules
of the Road' agreement shut down all efforts by Bosnian goveillment
authorities t~ ~ltili~~ j~lstice to remove war ~riminals from powerft:l
post-war pOSItIOns. I ~ In the words of one fonner OSCE tnal mOI1ltor, "the Rules of the Road program buried a lot of cases and inhibited prosecutions.,,103
The record of domestic authorities in BiH prosecuting war
crimes cases prior to 2004 reflects the structural disincentives for
domestic prosecutions. From an essentially infinite pool of potential
cases after the hOlTific war in Bosnia, only 5,700 cases were sent to
the ICTY for review. The extent to which the Rules of the Road
Program acted as a barrier to the pursuit of other cases cannot be
known, but it seems likely to have contributed. Even when cases
were approved by the ICTY, Bosnian officials were unlikely to bring
them to trial, perhaps due to the ongoing potential of an assertion of
primacy by the ICTY that would deprive domestic courts of jurisdiction. Of the 846 potential cases approved as Category A by the ICTY
under the Rules of the Road Program,104 only fifty-four (II %) had
reached trial stage in domestic courts by January 2005. 105
The Pursuit of Self-Interest by Domestic and Inteillational

2.

100. War Crimes Trials Belore the Domestic Courts of Bosnia & f-fer::.egovina. Progress
and Ohstacles, supra notc 19, at 50.
10 I. Interview with Biljana Potparic-Lipa, supra notc 99.
102 See Williams and Taft. supra note 92, at 253-54.
103. Tclephone Intcrview \'vith Dan Beckwith, Formcr OSCE Consultant and U.S. Statc
Court Judge (Aug. 19,2005).
104. War Crimes Thais Before the Domestic Courts ojBosnio & f-fer:egovino. Progress
and Ohstacles. supra notc 19. at 6.

105

!d
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Actors
The incentive structures created by the jurisdictional relationship of international primacy in tum framed the pursuit of selfinterest by officials in the ICTY and the BiH government, further impairing domestic judicial development during this first phase of the
ICTY's operation. At the national level, BiH suffered from deep political divides immediately after the Dayton Accords. Unsurprisingly, the prosecution of war crimes was politically charged, with accusations of bias and ethnically motivated cases. The stnlcture of the
judiciary, at the time, was such that local prosecutors' offices were
generally "dominated by the majority ethnicity," and largely had jurisdiction only over those of their own ethnici~. With little desire to
prosecute their own, few cases were initiated. 1 6 Moreover, key Serb
leaders in the FBiH and particularly in the RS were firmly opposed to
any prosecutions, which they felt would be largely directed against
Serbs. l07 In this context, the rational pursuit of self-interest militated
against championing domestic judicial institutions, leading a quest
for accountability, or even launching domestic prosecutions.
Struggles over the allocation of power within BiH between
the federal government and the republics further inhibited national
officials from seeking to enhance the status of the federal judiciary.
Officials in both the RS and FBiH sought institutional autonomy and
wanted to strengthen institutions at the regional or cantonal level at
the expense of federal institutions. However, since regional courts
would largely only have jurisdiction over individuals of their own
ethnic group-whom they did not want to subject to criminal prosecution-there was no reason to establish strong war crimes courts.
Efforts to create a federal war crimes court or enhance federal judicial power more generally were opposed by officials of the RS and
FBiH because they would lead to greater federal authority at the expense of entity-level governance.
Despite clear international legal duties to prosecute international crimes, lOR the ICTY's primary jurisdiction gave domestic offiId. at 4.
107. Siobodan Milosevi6, for example, decried the Tribunal's work as an attack on Bosnian Serbs. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can Intemational Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7,9 (2001). Local Serb newspapers in Bosnia
were also regular critics of the lCTY and any potential domestic prosecutions. See Interview
with Matais Hellman, ICTY Public Affairs Officer, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug. 5,
2005). In Serbia, Milosevi6 regularly denied visas to tribunal prosecutors. See Williams &
Taft, supra note 92, at 251.
108. For example, the Geneva Conventions include an affirmative obligation to search
for and prosecute the perpetrators of grave breaches of international humanitarian law in international armed conflicts. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
106.
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cials political cover for pursing their preferred outcomes-no prosecutions and no judicial development at the federal level. While international pressure meant that many government officials in BiH had to
express at least some support for accountability to avoid international
censure, they also asserted that the ICTY was a sufficient institutional response for ensuring accountability.109 When not outright
criticizing the ICTY, many politicians noted that the Tribunal would
initiate cases where necessary and, hence, potentially divisive domestic prosecutions were not needed. Though some elements of Bosnian
society did push for greater activity by domestic courts in the late
1990s, II 0 it was a common refrain in Bosnian politics that the ICTY
alone was an adequate solution. III
The shift to a jurisdictional relationship of absolute intelnational primacy under the Rules of Road Procedure made it far easier
for domestic officials in BiH to pursue their self-interest and avoid
domestic accountability. The structural barrier under that program of
international approval of domestic indictments made it far more difficult to undertake prosecutions in national courts. Moreover, the exceedingly slow pace of ICTY review provided yet another excuse for
domestic officials to refrain from undertaking prosecutions. With little to be gained from domestic prosecutions and strong structural incentives against such cases, it is not surprising that the track record of
national war crimes prosecutions in BiB prior to 2002 was so limited.
Just as self-interested action by national officials, framed by
the incentives of absolute international primacy, led national officials
in SiH to avoid strengthening the domestic judiciary or undertaking
significant domestic prosecutions, so too did the rational pursuit of
self-interest under international primacy lead ICTY officials to refrain from assisting in domestic judicial reconstruction efforts. For
ICTY officials, the structural relationship of absolute international
primacy and the measures of success set by the Security Council
meant that there was no personal or institutional gain from promoting
the development of domestic courts in BiH. In fact, such officials
of War part I, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949. The ICTY has found the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to be of an international character and thus the obligations of the Geneva Conventions
applicable. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. ICTY IT-94-I-A, Judgment,'1 87 (July 15,
1999).
109. See Interview with Matais Hellman, supra note 107. Such supPOt1 was generally
necessary to maintain foreign financial assistance and the good wi 1I of internationals working in Bosnia.
I 10. Generally these were calls for prosecutions of other ethnic groups. In effect there
was a triangle of blame whereby each ethnic group blamed the other two and advocated
prosecutions of the other two groups. See id.
Ill. See id I-!ellman notes that though there was significant opposition to the ICTY, it
was occasionally used as a shield for initiating serious domestic prosecutions.
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had an explicit incentive to limit the number of domestic prosecutions, in case the domestic prosecution should interfere with a case
presently before or potentially to be brought by the international
court. In short, ICTY officials were better off not approving domestic indictments under the Rules of the Road program than they would
be if they did authorize such cases.
While there is no evidence that ICTY officials intentionally
sought to bar domestic prosecutions in BiH, at the very least, they
chose not to devote the kinds of resources that would be necessary
for the Rules of the Road Program to review domestic cases effectively. The ICTY's record in approving such cases is telling. Between 1996 and 2004, the ICTY's Rules of the Road Unit received
files relating to 5,789 persons suspected of war crimes and, by September 2004, the Tribunal had categorized 3,489 such cases. I 12 Of
these, only 864 were approved for domestic tria1. 113 More than 2,300
cases (40%) sent to the ICTY were never reviewed and no response
was sent to the Government of BiH. II4 Such a poor track record of
reviewing case files and approving domestic prosecutions indicates,
at the very least, that the ICTY failed to prioritize case review under
the Rules of the Road program and did not devote time or resources
to ensuring that domestic prosecutions could proceed. Given the incentive stmctures of absolute international primacy and the interests
of ICTY officials, such an outcome is understandable, if disappointmg.
3.

The Lack of Norm Leadership

During this first phase of the ICTY's operations, norm leadership was essentially absent in the relationships between the ICTY and
domestic institutions in BiH. Domestic officials failed to look up to
their international counterparts for best practices, advice, and guidance. Similarly, international officials did not seek to generate or
disseminate clear sets of norms in the criminal law field for their domestic counterparts to adopt. As a result, during this first phase there
was little, if any, socialization of domestic actors and institutions that
could have promoted the more effective functioning of the domestic
judiciary.
The lack of nOffil leadership can again be explained by the jurisdictional relationships and the self-interest of domestic and inter112.

War Crimes Trials Be/ore the Domesric Courts ofBosnia & Her::.egovino, Progress

Clnd Ohslacles ..wpm notc 19, at 6.
113. lei.
114. !d.
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national actors discussed above. International officials at the ICTY,
who were evaluated on the quality and quantity of ICTY prosecutions, had neither the mandate nor inclination to offer guidance or
norm leadership to domestic institutions. Efforts to develop or disseminate such norms would detract from the Tribunal's core mission.
Likewise, there were few incentives for domestic officials to seek out
and adopt norms for a more effective judiciary. In a jurisdictional relationship of absolute international primacy, domestic actors had
nothing to gain from improving the quality of national institutions
and hence little reason to look to the ICTY for norm leadership.
Moreover, the interests of most individuals in the BiH government
augured in favor of a weak, even incompetent, federal judiciary. As
a result, national officials neither sought out nor sought to implement
international norms and best practices that might have been available.
Taken collectively, the incentives created by jurisdictional relationships of international primacy and then absolute international
primacy, the shared interests of domestic and international officials in
a weak national judiciary, and a lack of nonn leadership resulted in a
severe chilling of the development and activation of domestic judicial
institutions in BiH. The overall influence of the ICTY during this period was to deter domestic judicial development and limit the exercise of domestic criminal jurisdiction over war crimes through what
were effectively sanctions imposed by the jurisdictional relationship
of intenlational primacy that increased the costs for domestic actors
of using national judicial institutions. Though exact numbers reported vary, only something 011 the order of sixty separate war crimes
trials, often involving multiple defendants, had reached a final verdict
in BiH courts by 2004. 115 Those cases that did go to trial were often
marked by lack of independence and fainless. For example, between
1993 and 1995, "47 war crimes suspects were tried and convicted in
abstentia in the military court in the Municipality of Orasje."116
Many trials that did occur were politically motivated prosecutions of
Serbs in the FBiH. 117 In other cases delays were so great that justice

1]5.

Of these, only two trials have been in the RS, with the remainder in the FBiH. See

id
Id at4.
For example, one notable trial in the District Military Court of Sarajevo involved
the conviction of Sretko Damjanovic for genocide and crimes against humanity in 1993. See
id. at 4. The Human Rights Chamber of BiH eventually overturned the case in 2002 on
grounds that the District Military Court "lacked a sufficient appearance of independence."
Id The conviction was quashed in 2002. International observers similarly condemned another trial of Ibrahim Dedovic in 1997 for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the
Sarajevo Cantonal Coul1. His conviction was ovel1urned in a second trial in 2000. See id. at
..J..
116.

1 i 7.
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was not served. 118 While some observers have lauded the fact that
any trials were conducted at all, the record is generally quite poor,119
pmiicularly given the overwhelming number of crimes that OCCUlTed
during the conflict. 120

B.

Phase 1J: The ICTY's Catalytic

E.fJectfi~om

2002 On

While the record of judicial development and domestic prosecutions in BiH prior to 2002 was poor, beginning that year, considerable new effOlis were initiated to enhance the capacity and quality of
domestic justice in Bosnia. Those changes can be attributed to modifications to the jurisdictional relationship between the ICTY and the
national COUlis that flowed from the launch of the ICTY's Completion Strategy that same year, as well as the changing self-interests of
domestic officials as the country stabilized and federal power was
consolidated. Rather than chilling the development of the domestic
judiciary, the altered jurisdictional relationship and the incentives
that it created for domestic and international actors allowed the ICTY
to help facilitate the development and activation of domestic criminal
jurisdiction. This section traces the ways in which the ICTY Completion Strategy altered the Tribunal's interactions with BiH and contributed to the establishment of the new State Comi of Bosnia & Herzegovina and, paliicularly, its war crimes chambers.
1.

Toward a Jurisdictional Relationship Akin to
Complementarity

The development of the ICTY's Completion Strategy in 2002
altered the jurisdictional relationship between the ICTY and the institutions of BiH. While the relationship of absolute international primacy during Phase I allowed the ICTY to sanction the domestic exercise of jurisdiction by increasing the costs for domestic actors
seeking to prosecute,12J the Comple60n Strategy adopted by the UN
Security Council put the Tribunal in a position to monitor domestic
118. For example, in the Gulubovic case, though investigations were launched in 1994,
the trial did not commence until February 2000. ld. at 4.
119. Interview with Dan Beckwith, supra note 103.
120. For a consideration of the nature of violations of international humanitarian law
during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, see Final Report oj the Commission ojExperts
on Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc.
SI1994/674 (May 27,1994).
121. See Williams & Taft, supra note 92, at 254 (observing that "the Tribunal not only
failed to create an environment conducive to the growth of other mechanisms of justice. but
affilmatively sought to prevent the creation of a Bosnian Truth Commission").
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institutions and sanction instead the failure of those institutions to
undertake genuine criminal proceedings. These new incentives created by the new jurisdictional relationship had a strong catalytic impact on the exercise of domestic criminal jurisdiction in BiB.
The changes to the ICTY's jurisdictional relationship with the
comis of BiB were undertaken through the Tribunal's Completion
Strategy, itself a product of demands from Security Council members
for the ICTY to complete its work in a reasonable time frame such
that it would not continue to consume considerable resources. The
Completion Strategy, as adopted by the Security Council, required
the ICTY to reduce its caseload and to encourage domestic trials as a
cost-effective alternative to international prosecutions. As thenTribunal President Claude Jorda stated in a 2002 report to the Security Council, the goal of the Tribunal became to try only "the highestranking political, military, paramilitary and civilian leaders and ...
[toJ refer ... certain cases to national courtS."l22 Thc goal was therefore to limit the work of the ICTY and develop national institutions
as viable alternative fora for thc prosecution of international crimes.
As Herman von Habel, a Senior Legal Advisor at the ICTY, observed, "primarily we were driven by the Comj;letion Strategy but we
also had in mind motivating national courts."L3
The structural changes in the ICTY's jurisdiction and mandate undertaken as pali of the Completion Strategy essentially shifted
the governance structure from one of absolute inten1ational primacy
toward a new relationship with incentives similar to those of complementarity. Technically, a jurisdictional relationship of complementarity requires limiting prosecution by an international tribunal to
circumstances in which national institutions failed to undCliake genuine prosecutions of their own. Although not exactly the same, the
changes in the rCTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) undCliaken as part of the Completion Stratcgy resulted in a jurisdictional relationship under which the ICTY could send cases back to
national jurisdictions, monitor domestic proceedings, and remove
cases back to the international fonlm only if key targets were not
met. Such a relationship produces incentives very similar to those of
complementarity because the international tribunal can monitor domestic procecdings and sanction the failure of national institutions to
undertake genuine prosecutions.
As part of the Completion Strategy, thc Rules of the Road
122. Press Release, ICTY President .Judge Claude Jorda, Address to the United lations
Security Council U.N. Doc. JDH/PJ.S/690-e (July 26, 2002) [hereinafter .J(mla July 2002
Address].
123
Interview with Herman Van Hebel. in The Hague. Neth. (July I. 200S)
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program ended on 1 October 2004, after the ICTY Prosecutor informed the Presidency of Bosnia & Herzegovina that it would "no
longer be in a position to review war crimes cases and that the CBiH
Prosecutor should take over responsibility for" such reviews. 124 As a
result, the attendant disincentive for domestic prosecution created by
the program quickly abated. National officials no longer had to seek
international approval to undertake prosecutions and could proceed
with cases on their own initiative. As a result, it became far easier
for domestic prosecutions to proceed. In 2004, the OSCE observed a
"significant increase in the number of cases proceeding before the
cantonal courts in the FBiH."125 Specifically, fifteen war crimes
cases involving twenty-four defendants proceeded to trial and verdict
in 2004. 126 As early as 2005, another fourteen cases involving thirtyfour defendants were pending in cantonal courts. l27 One expeli from
the OSCE has commented that it is now easier for cantonal courts in
Sarajevo and Mostar to prosecute given that it is clear the ICTY will
not be investigating those cases. 128
In addition to the termination of the Rules of the Road program, modification of the Tribunal's RPE accomplished a fundamental change in the nature of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The RPE were
amended to allow for transfer of cases back to national institutions,
while ensuring that basic human rights standards and procedural
safeguards would be met and providing for the recall of cases to the
[CTY if they were not. 129 The resultant Rule Ilbis provides that, afer an indictment has been confirmed by the ICTY and upon a motion
\)f the Prosecutor or a prioprio motu action by the chambers, a case
,;an be transferred to a state "(a) in whose territory the crime was
i.:ommitted;" or (b) "in which the accused was arrested;" or (c) "having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept
such a case."130 The amended rule further calls for the creation of a
special judicial bench to evaluate motions for referral based on "the
gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the
124. The BiB Presidency accepted the revocation of the Rome Agreement. War Crimes
Trials Before the Domestic COllrts of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Progress and Obstacles, Sllpro

note

19, at 5.

125.
126.

Ie!. at 6.
Of these, 15 defendants were acquitted. lei. at 6.

127.

Ie!.

128. Interview with Dorthee larotine, OSCE Legal Advisor, in Sarajevo, Bosn. &
Herz. (Aug. 3, 2005).
129. See generolly Lan-y D. Johnson, Closing an Internatiunal Criminal Tribunal While
"v[aintaining International Human Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 Ay!. J. INT'!.
L. 158 (2005).
130. ICTY Rules, Rule 11 his (A). A similar amendment to the Rules of Procedure and
C:vidence of the Intem3tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was also undertaken although
here have not yet been ay motions for transfer under the Rule.
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accused.,,131 In addition, the referral bench must be "satisfied that
the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will not
be imposed or carried out." 132 In the amendment to Rule 11 his, the
Tribunal maintained the authority to recall a transferred case back to
the ICTY at the request of the Prosecutor, giving it the ability to intervene if a national proceeding does not meet basic standards of
fairness and procedure. 133
The ICTY's newfound power to decide whether to transfer
cases back to national courts and to recall cases that had been transferred should domestic prosecutions be inadequate gave the Tribunal
considerable new leverage over the operation of domestic institutions. Rule 11 his put the ICTY in a position from which it could
monitor the quality of the domestic judiciary, provide a benefit to national courts through the transfer of cases to them where they met
certain international standards, and sanction domestic courts that
failed to meet those standards through the recall of cases to the
ICTY. This ability to monitor domestic judicial institutions allowed
the ICTY to have far greater influence on both the quality and quantity of domestic prosecutions.
Although the jurisdictional relationship created by Rule 11 his
is not fonnally one of complementarity as the ICTY still retained
primary jurisdiction pursuant to Article 9(2) of its statute, the
changes created stnlctural incentives very close to those of complementairty. Specifically, the ICTY must affirmatively transfer cases
back to the national jurisdictions, but only does so where national
courts are competent and meet international standards. Hence, just as
with pure complementarity, if national officials wish to prosecute,
they must demonstrate that they can undertake genuine criminal
prosecutions. Where national courts are unable to meet those standards generally, the ICTY need not transfer a case back to domestic
institutions. Once a case is transferred, the ICTY is able to monitor
ongoing national prosecutions and, just as in pure complementarity,
where those domestic proceedings are inadequate, the ICTY can recall that case back to The Hague. Again much like a "pure" complementarity relationship, if domestic officials wish for national
prosecutions to proceed, the revised jurisdictional relationship gives
them incentives to enhance the quality and capacity of national insti131. lCTY Rules, Rule 11 bis (C). Rule 28(A) was also amended to give the judges the
ability to review cases to determine if the level of seniority of the accused is appropriate for
prosecution before the ICTY. See Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Efj'ects of the Completion
Strategies on the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. 1. INT'L L. 142, 146
(2005).
132. ICTY Rules, Rule 11 bis (8)
133. ICTY Rules, Rule J 1bis (n
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tutions and provides the international tribunal the authority to monitor and sanction domestic courts that prove inadequate.
While the amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provided sufficient legal grounds for the referral of cases to national jurisdictions, the RPE only set minimum guidelines as to when
domestic courts should be deemed prepared to receive a case back
from the ICTY. The Tribunal's 2002 report to the Security Council,
however, offered additional considerations for making such determinations and was subsequently endorsed by the Council itself. 134
These requirements for referral back provided domestic courts with
clear guidelines and targets around which to structure reform effOlis,
including that the "accused answer in national courts for all the
crimes specified in the indictments" and that "national trials are conducted in accordance with the international norms for the protection
of human rights."135 Among the enumerated human rights protections are an adequate domestic legal framework; "the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary;" "judicial experience or training" so
as to be able to conduct a war crimes trial; sufficient "financial and
logistical resources," and adequate "pretrial detention." Further, the
Report required that "codes of criminal procedure are in line with the
international conventions on the protection of human rights;" that "a
code of professional conduct for the judiciary has been adopted;" that
"slowness of proceedings" has been addressed; that "detainees are
treated equally," and that "public proceedings are guaranteed."136
This extensive catalogue of rights and requirements seeks to guarantee that any domestic trials will meet minimum international standards.
Significantly, the more detailed criteria included in the Tribunal's report gave domestic officials clear guidelines for structuring
judicial reform efforts to ensure that national courts could meet the
targets set by the ICTY for transfer of cases. Rule 11 his also gave
the ICTY considerable leverage to encourage national courts to meet
those targets. As Larry Johnson, Chief of Staff to the ICTY President, commented, "the ICTY is required to access the quality of domestic justice."]37 In order to receive a case and retain jurisdiction
once the case is transferred, the criteria of domestic preparedness set
134. See Mundis, supra note] 3], at 142-44.
135. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Report on the Judicial
Staws of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Fonner Yugoslavia and the Prospects
for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, ~ 84, U.N. Doc. 5/2002/678 (.June 19,
2002).
136. ld
137. See Interview with Larry Johnson, Chief of Staff to the President of the ICTY. ill
The Hague, eth. (July I, 2005).
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by the ICTY and approved by the Security Council must be met. The
transfer of cases under Rule 11 his gave the ICTY a means of providing benefits directly to national institutions within BiH that met the
criteria for an effective judiciary.
A decision by the ICTY to refer a case to the CBiH involves
an international affirmation of the quality of the Bosnian judiciary or,
more particularly, the quality of the new CBiH.138 In fact, the Bosnian government has pushed strongly to take these cases back, in part
because it has recognized this legitimating effect. 139 In the words of
the CBiH President: "These cases are within our jurisdiction. It is
not so much that we want them, but that we have a right to try them.
And when the ICTY hands them back to us it validates our work in
building this court and expands our credibility.,,140 In submissions to
the ICTY, BiH has been quick to asseli how its new and reformed judicial institutions meet these targets established by the Tribunal and
endorsed by the Security Council. Submissions by the BiH government in the Dragomir A1ilosevic Case, for example, emphasised that
Bosnia "is in all respects prepared and able to deal with any case
which the Chamber deems appropriate for referral.,,141 The ICTY's
"carrot" of a case transfer allowed it to push national institutions to
meet the benchmarks it had set for the effectiveness of a domestic judiciary.142
The jurisdictional relationship created by Rule 11 his incorporates a number of feedback loops to ensure the ongoing quality of
domestic courts and prosecutions. The ability of the ICTY to recall
cases previously transferred to national courts allows the Tribunal to
monitor and, perhaps, influence domestic proceedings. As the ICTY
Referral Bench observed in the Rasevic and Todovic Case, "[t]his
monitoring mechanism enables a measure of continuing oversight
138. In its submissions to the ICTY, Bosnia ha made clear that the Court of Bosnia &
Herzegovina is the only competent institution to receive the casco See Prosecutor v. Zeljko
Mejakic et a!., Case No. IT -02-65-PT, Response by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bit!) to Questions Posed by the Specially Appointed Chamber in its Decision for Further Information in the Context of the Prosecutor's Request under Rulc Ilbis (Feb. 9, 2005)

139.

See id.
See Interview

with Biljana Potparic-Lipa, supra note 99.
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/l-PT, Response by the Government of
Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) to Questions Posed by the Specially Appointed Chamber in its
Order for Further Submissions on the Gravity of the Crimcs and the Level of Responsibility
of the Accused. at 3-4 (Feb. 9, 2005). ate that in this case the Govemmenl of BiH opposed transfer on the ground that the level of responsibility of the accused was sufficiently
high that he should bc tried before the international forum. For a more detailed argument of
the preparedness of the Bosnian judiciary, see Prosecutor v. Mejakic, Gruban, Fustar &
Knezevic, Response by the Govemmcnl of Bosnia & Herzegovina (Bi H) to Questions Posed
by the Specially Appointed Chamber in its Decision for Funher Information in the Context
of the Prosecutor's Request under Rule II his (Feb. 9, 2005) (on fi Ie with author).
142. See [ntervicw with Larry Johnson, supra notc ]37.
140.

141.
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over trial proceedings should a case be referred."143 The result is not
only to catalyze domestic prosecution, but also to encourage national
courts to meet a relatively high standard of justice. 144 The Organization on Securit~ and Cooperation in Europe monitors all trials before
the new CBiH 45 and reports back to the ICTY on a regular basis. 146
The ICTY Referral Bench may decide to recall a case that does not
meet fair trial requirements or in which the accused is not tried on the
charges specified in the international indictment. 147 In cases involving a possible constitutional violation, review is also jossible before
the Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina,14 which can directly apply the European Convention on Human Rights. 149 Finally,
143. Prosecutor v. Rasevic & Todovic, Case No. IT-97-25/l-PT, Decision on the Referral of Case under Rule I Ibis, ~ 84 (July 8, 2005).
144. See Interview with David Tolben, supra note 81. The Tribunal has been careful to
note its ability to recall cases in its I Ibis decisions as a way to ensure compliance. In the
Stankovic case, for example, the tribunal noted that if fair trial requirements were not met,
'"then a refenal order may be revoked by this tribunal." Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No.
IT-96-23/2-PT, Conigendum to Decision on Refenal of Case under Rule I Ibis, ~ 68 (May
27,2005).
145. The OSCE has already been involved in extensive monitoring of trials at the cantonal and district levels. See War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Progress and Obstacles, supra note 19. The OSCE has recruited and trained
Bosnian staff in trial monitoring.
146. The exact recipient of such repons has yet to be determined as it is necessary to
ensure that the prosecution, defense, and chambers all receive reports in a like fashion. Interview with Dan Beckwith, supra note 103.
147. See ICTY Rules, Rule I I his.
148. See CONST. BOSN. & HERZ. art. VI(3)(b) ("The Constitutional Court shall also have
appellate jurisdiction over issues under this Constitution arising out of a judgment of any
other court in Bosnia & Herzegovina").
149. See CONST. BOSN. & HERZ. at1. 11(2) ("The rights and freedoms set forth in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia & Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all
other law."); see also Interview with David Feldman, supra note 15 (suggesting that such a
challenge was entirely possible). The Constitutional Court has, in fact, reviewed the constitutionality of the State Court itself. See Decision on the Law of the Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina is Hereby Declared to be in Conformity with the Constitution of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Case No. U26/0 I, (Sept. 28, 200 I). The decisions of the ICTY trial and appeals
chambers to refer a case to Bosnia or recall it from Bosnia, however, would be beyond the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Coun. The Constitutional Court has routinely held that it
does not have the power to review the decisions of international institutions or the Dayton
Accords themselves. See Interview with David Feldman, supra note 15. For Constitutional
Court jurisprudence limiting the powers and jurisdiction of the COUlt with respect to international agencies or the Dayton Accords, see Decision, The Appeal of the Office of the Public
Attorney of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina against the Decision of the Human
Rights Chamber of II March 1998 in Case No. CH/96/30, S.D. v. The Federation of Bosnia
& Herzegovina, Case No. U7/98, (finding that "[t]he Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina does not have appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Human Rights Chamber
for Bosnia & Herzegovina" because it is an equal institution established under the Dayton
Accords). The Constitutional Court has clearly stated that it cannot review a decision of the
High Representative as his powers were conferred through an international agreement. See
Ruling, The Appeal of37 Representatives of the House of Representatives of the Parliament
of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina against the Decision of the High Representative
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if all domestic remedies are exhausted, an appeal to the European
Court of Human Rights remains a possibility. Collectively these
feedback loops create an extremely robust appellate review procedure
and generate strong incentives for domestic judicial actors to provide
a high quality of justice that can withstand both domestic and international scrutiny.
The nature of this new jurisdictional relationship and the influence it gives the ICTY to monitor or sanction domestic courts is
well stated by the ICTY President, Claude Jorda. In his 2002 report
to the Security Council, he advocated the creation of a three-tier judicial architecture:
The first tier, the International Tribunal, essentially
handles the major political ... leaders. . .. The second tier, the State Court, chiefly handles intermediarylevel accused who would be referred by the International Tribunal . . .. The third tier, the local courts,
handles low-ranking accused tried in accordance with
the Rome Agreement. Within this stnlcture, the International Tribunal would be responsible for overseeing
the proper conduct of the second-tier trials and the
State C0U11 the third-tier trials. 150
This framework, Jorda argued, could both "steer the action of the international community" and promote trials by "a centralised State
COUl1 sitting in Sarajevo.,,151
By August 2005, the ICTY Prosecutor had already sought the
referral of ten cases back to BiB. Of these ten requests, the ICTY
sent a significant majority back to BiB pursuant to Rule 11 bis 152 and
only denied one request. In order to evaluate these requests and examine the domestic institutions that would receive cases, a special
Referral Bench was established, with one judge from each of the
of Bosnia & Herzegovina No. 86/01 of 23 February 2001 is Rejected, Case No. U37/01,
OFFfCIAL GAZETTE OF BIH (Bosn. & Herz.).
150. Jorda July 2002 Address, supra note 122.
151. ld. For the Prosecutor's view of this proposal, which accords closely with that of
Jorda, see Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Address by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Mrs. Carla Del Ponte to the United Nations Security Council (Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://www.un.orglicty/pressreal/p709e.htm.
152. See Prosecutor v. Jankovic, Case o. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case
under Rule II bis (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakic, Gruban, Fustar & Knezevic, Case
No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant To Rule
llbis (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rasevic & Todovic, Case No. IT-97-25/l-PT, Decision
on the Referral of Case under Rule II bis (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No.
IT-96-23/2-PT, Corrigendum to Decision on Referral of Case under Rule Ilbis (May 27,
2005).
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three trial chambers of the ICTy. 15 3 In addition, two Senior Legal
Officers were tasked with working on the referral cases. In evaluating the quality of the Bosnian judiciary, the Referral Bench has relied
upon detailed submissions of the parties, amicus briefs filed by the
Government ofBiH,l54 and reports from the OSCE. 155
This referral bench monitors proceedings before the BiH judiciary for the ICTY and thereby determines whether domestic courts
meet the criteria for refenal. The first referral decision, the Stankovic
Case, examined in detail the preparedness of the Bosnian judiciary to
receive cases and undertake fair and effective prosecutions. Issues
considered included which court in BiH would receive the case, the
applicable substantive law, the non-imposition of the death penalty,
general fair trial rights, the ability of BiH to offer a trial without undue delay, the availability of witnesses, and the monitoring of any
domestic trials that occur. 156
In the Stanko vic decision, the Tribunal commented favorably
on the creation of the CBiH and new domestic legislation facilitating
prosecution of international crimes. Likewise, it affirmed a procedure through which indictments sent to BiH would be forwarded to
the Prosecutor's Office of the CBiH. The CBiH Prosecutor shall, in
turn, "adapt the ICTY indictment to make it compliant with the BiH
Criminal Procedure Code" and forward it "to the State Comi of
BiH.,,157 With respect to fair trial rights, the Refenal Bench announced, after enumerating a long series of requirements, that it
"considers that the legal stnlcture of Bosnia & Herzegovina, as it
now stands, is sufficient to safeguard the right of the Accused to a

153. The RefelTal Bench consists of Judge Alphons Orie, Presiding, and Judges O-Gon
Kwon and Kevin Parker.
154. In all of the cases to date, defense has sought to avoid referral back, prefelTing instead trial before the ICTY. This is not at all surprising given both the quality of justice and
the significant differences between imprisonment in Bosnia & Herzegovina and the states
that generally incarcerate ICTY convicts. In some cases, the defcnse has sought, as an alternative, transfer to Serbia. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rasevic & Todovic, Case No. IT-97-25/1PT, Decision on the Referral of Case under Rule llhis, ~ 27,28 (July 8, 2005). In that case,
Rasevic sought transfer to Serbia on grounds that it was the state in which the accused was
arrested, a valid state for transfer pursuant to Rule II his. Todovic argued that based on his
Serbian nationality he should also be transfened to Serbia and Montenegro.
ISS. See id. (! 109, (noting "the standing of the OSCE and the neutrality of its approach
ought to ensure that the reports it provides will adequately reflect Defense as well as Prosecution issues").
156. Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Corrigendum to Decision on
Referral of Case under Rule I Ibis, (May 27,2005).
157. Id.~; 24. The relevant legislation is Law on Transfer of Cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia &
Herzegovina and the use of Evidence Collected by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia in Proceedings Before the Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF BrH (j 1104 (Bosn. & Herz.) [hereinafter Law on Transfer of Cases].
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fair trial."158 The Bench concluded: "being satisfied on the information presently available that the Accused should receive a fair trial
and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out ... referral ... should be ordered." 159
The affirmation of the ability of the CBiH to provide a fair
trial and the subsequent referral of significant cases from the ICTY
back to BiH has, in fact, provided a clear mark of international legitimation for the BiH judiciary. While opinions of the ICTY differed greatly in Bosnia and the ICTY has been subject to considerable criticism, there was general consensus in BiH that the
willingness of the ICTY to send cases back to domestic courts was a
significant legitimator. The CBiH has received very favorable attention in the local press, particularly with respect to its organized crime
prosecutions. 160 The ICTY decisions under Rule 11 bis have been
largely welcomed in Sarajevo. 161 In the words of Mustafa Bisi6, Assistant Minister of Justice for the Execution of Criminal Sanctions,
"the referral of cases gives the State Court new clout. It is seen now
as a real court.,,162
The jurisdictional relationship created by Rule 11 bis allowed
the ICTY to monitor domestic courts, to provide benefits to national
courts based on the performance of those institutions, and to sanction
domestic courts that failed to meet minimum requirements through
the recall of cases back to The Hague. In so doing, the new jurisdictional relationship created a set of incentives that essentially mirrored
those of complementarity. Domestic officials had new reasons to
seek improvement in the quality and capacity of national institutions;
international officials had the leverage to promote such improvement.
2.

The Congruence of Domestic and International Self-Interest

A growing domestic interest in the establishment of national
criminal courts provided an essential addition to the incentives created by the new jurisdictional relationship under Rule 11 bis to catalyze the Bosnian domestic judiciary. Alone, even the new incentives
created by Rule 11 bis would not likely have catalyzed the reform of
158. Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Corrigendum to Decision on
Referral of Case under Rule I Ibis. ~168 (May 27, 2005).
159. !d. ~ 96.
160. Interview with Refik llodzic, Public Affairs Director. Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug. 9,2005).
161. lei. For some examples of local reporting, see Press Release, Fena. ICTY Decides
to Refer Case against Mejakic, Gruban, Fustar and Knezevic to BiH (July 20. 2005).
162. Interview with Mustafa Bisic, Assistant Minister of Justice, in Sarajevo, Bosn. &
Herz. (Aug. 8,2005).

2008]

INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

329

domestic judicial institutions because neither domestic nor inte111ational officials had strong interests in a more effective Bosnian judiciary throughout most of the 1990s. For the incentives created by the
jurisdictional relationship under Rule 11 bis to have any catalytic effect, there had to be meaningful domestic demand for national prosecutions. Lacking such demand, the prospect of referral back of cases
to national courts would not promote domestic judicial reform, precisely because domestic officials would not have wanted to receive
cases or undertake their own prosecutions. By 2002, however, the
self-interest of both domestic and international officials began to shift
in favor of more domestic prosecutions and the development of a
more robust national judicial infrastructure. These shifts in domestic
preferences, when channeled through the new incentives created by
Rule 11 bis, provided a powerful catalytic force for the refonn and activation of the domestic judiciary in BiH.
Beginning in the late 1990s, a range of new political pressures
in BiH led domestic actors, particularly at the federal level, to recognize the possibility of personal political gain as well as more effective governance through an enhanced federal level judiciary. Although the Constitution of Bosnia & Herzegovina vested federal
authorities with law enforcement powers, in the post-Dayton period
no federal institutions existed to fulfill this function. 163 Subsequently, however, federal authorities consolidated power, and support
began to materialize for the creation of a federal judiciary with
criminal jurisdiction.
A number of factors contributed to this growing domestic
demand for federal authority, generally, and federal criminal courts
more specifically. First, over time the need for devolved power at the
entity level to moderate ethnic tensions-a hallmark of the Dayton
accords-declined as ethnic tensions cooled. 164 Second, continuing
criticism of and lack of faith in the poor qual ity and ethic domination
of entity level judicial institutions meant that the future stability of
the state depended on the existence of a less biased federal level judiciary.165 Third, the Constitutional Court took significant steps during
its first term to strengthen federal institutions, enhancing federal
power such that a federal judiciary became possible.1 66 As a result,
163. See supra, text accompanying notes 19-20.
164. See GENERAL FRA'VIEWORK AGREEMENT, supra note 12.
loS. See Consultants' Report to the OHR: The Future of Domestic \-Var Crimes Proseelltions in Bosnia & Herzegovina, May 2002, annex [ at 1 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Consultants' Report) (observing that "there appears to be Iittle con fidence that such cases
can be tt'ied impartially, independently. and free of political, criminal or other influence or
without ethnic bias").
lo(i
Interview with Da\'id Feldman. SUfJl"U note 15. at 5. See, e.g. Decision. The Ap-
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powerful domestic interests were aligned for the establishment and
activation of domestic criminal jurisdiction in BiH.
As a result of these developments, on 12 November 2000 the
OHR, which still had executive lawmaking authority-enacted The
Law on the Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, establishing a federal
court of first instance. 167 In addition, a new Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted, specifying the general criminal process in BiH, the
powers of the various parties, and the rights of accused at trial. 168 At
this stage, the CBiH had only limited criminal jurisdiction (notably
not including war crimes), administrative jurisdiction over acts of the
federal government, and appellate jurisdiction over its own decisions. 169
Beginning in late 2002, domestic interest groups pushed for

peal of the Office of the Public Attorney of the Federation of Bosnia & I lerzogovina against
thc Decision of the Human Rights Chamber of 11 March 1998 in the Case No. CH/96/30,
S.D. v. The Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., Case No. U 7/98 (Canst. Ct. Bosn. & Herz. 1999) (affirming the power of the Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz.). The existence of the
Court of BiH was itself challenged before the Constitutional Court. See also Decision, The
Law on the Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE BtH 29/00) is hereby declared to be in Conformity with the Constitution of Bosnia & Herzogovina, Case No. U
26/0 J (Canst. Ct. Bosn. & Herz. 2001) (finding that the Dayton Accords granted federal
powers to establish a state court and that "the establishment of the Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina can be expected to be an important element in ensuring that the institutions of Bosnia
& Herzegovina act in conformity with the rule of law ..."). See also Consultants' Report,
supra note 165, at 37.
167. Other legislation imposed by the High Representative at this time included: HR
Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Law on the Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE BIH 24/02 (Bosn. & Herz.); HR Decision Enacting the Law Reamending the Law on the Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 3/03
(Bosn. & Herz.); Decision Enacting the Law on Further Re-amending the Law on the Court
of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFfCIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 37/03 (Bosn. & Herz.); HR Decision
Enacting the Law on the Amendments to the Law on Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina,
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 4/04 (Bosn. & Herz.); HR Decision Enacting the Law on the
Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 24/02 (Bosn. &
Herz.), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=27652;
HR Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor's Office of
Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 3/03 (Bosn. & 11erz.), available at
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=29093; HR Decision Enacting the Law on Re-amending the Law on the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BrH 37/03 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ohr.int/deci
sions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=31102; HR Decision Enacting the Law on the Judicial Police of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIB 3/03 (Bosn. & Herz.),
availahfe at http://www .ohr. inti decisions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=29090; HR
Decision Enacting the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF BrH 3/03 (Bosn & Herz.); HR Decision Enacting the Law on Protecting Witnesses under Threat and Vulnerable Witnesses, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 3/03 (Bosn. &
Herz.).
168. See HR Decision Enacting the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia & Herzogovina,
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BrH 3/03 (Bosn. & Herz.).
169. See Law on the Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIB 16/02
(B05n. & Herz.) arts. 13-15.
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the expansion of the State Court's jurisdiction to hear organized
crimes and war crimes cases. With the arrival in 2002 of Paddy Ashdown, the new High Representative, the fight against organized
crime became a top priority and a new judicial infrastructure was
needed to address the growing threat presented by organized crime
groups.l70 Expanding the jurisdictional reach of the CBiH was an
obvious solution. 171 By this time, even some entity level officials in
the FBiH and the RS were more willing to accept a special court to
deal with war crimes as well as organized crime so that ethnically
charged cases would not land on their doorsteps. As an official at the
Ministry of Justice explained, "the nature of the criminal acts in question is such that it is not enough to have judicial bodies at the entity
level. They are needed at the state level as well."l72 Finally, as frustration with the ICTY grew, federal level officials began to push for
domestic prosecutions of war crimes as an alternative to the inten1ational tribunal. In the words of the President of the State Court, "the
victims are citizens of Bosnia & Herzegovina. We have a moral,
ethical and legal right to prosecute ourselves." 173
During 2002 and 2003, these domestic pressures percolated
through the Bosnian government, yet endowing the State Court with
war crimes jurisdiction was not without opposition. Some entity
level officials, particularly in the RS, resisted the creation of a federal
court, which they believed might be biased against Serbs. Others
contested the legality of a federal court of first instance under the
constitutional framework established by the Dayton Accords. 174 In
addition, funding a domestic war crimes court remained a critical
problem given the serious constraints on the Bosnian federal budget
and the limited interest of donor states in funding additional criminal
tribunals.
When set against the backdrop of the new incentives created
170. Interview with John Peyton, supra note 25, at 6.
171. See id.
172. See Interview with Mustafa Bisi6, supra note 162, at 36. The 2002 Consultants'
Report further observed: "[I]n meetings with representatives of the Federation and Brcko
District, there was considerable support for a special state level court to deal with war crimes
cases. In Republika Srpska there was support for special courts to deal with war crimes at
the Entity level." Consultants' Report, supra note 165, at 37.
173. See Interview with Biljana Potpari6-Lipa, supra note 99, at 25. For an official
IC1'Y statement indicating the readiness of Bosnian courts to receive cases, see Prosecutor v.
Mejaki6, Case No. 11'-02-65, Decision for Further Information in the Context of the Prosecutor's Request under Rule 11bis (Feb. 9,2005).
174. The issue was argued before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina in
2000 and the power of the state to create a federal level judiciary was upheld in 200 I. See
Decision, The Law on the COUlt of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE BIH 29/00 is
hereby declared to be in Conformity with the Constitution of Bosma & Herzogovina. Case
No. U 26/0 I (Const. Ct. Bosn. & Herz. 200 I).
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by the governance structure of Rule 11 bis, the interests of domestic
actors-who were now coming to favor a federal level war crimes
court-proved extremely powerful. Federal level officials in BiH
could benefit from the enhancement of domestic judicial institutions
and greater federal power through the creation of a special war
crimes chamber. In so doing, the federal government could prove to
both national and international audiences that the federal institutions
in Bosnia were capable of even the most demanding criminal prosecutions and that BiH had effectively recovered from the aftermath of
conflict. With the end of the Rules of the Road program, a clear
statement of the types of cases the ICTY would prosecute, and the
possibility of transfer of cases back to BiH, national officials could
count on a relatively independent judiciary and could benefit from
championing the cause of a revived Bosnian judiciary. Simultaneously, federal officials could wrest power away from entity level institutions by establishing a federal level criminal court, particularly
one that had been given the stamp of approval by the ICTY through
the transfer of cases back to it. The result was a new and powerful
domestic interest block in BiH pushing for a federal war crimes court
and the more general enhancement of domestic judicial institutions.
The advent of the ICTY's Completion Strategy also altered
the self-interest of international officials at the ICTY, who soon
found that their own mission could be furthered through a more effective domestic judiciary in BiH. In 2001 and 2002, key donor
states became fnlstrated with the costs of the ICTY nearly a decade
after the end of the war in Bosnia. As a result, the Security Council
pushed the ICTY to complete its work by 2008 through the aforementioned Completion Strategy. 175 However, the ICTY lacked the
capacity or resources to prosecute many of the lower level perpetrators who were either indicted or already in custody.176 In response,
as part of its Completion Strategy, the ICTY limited future indictments to more senior figures, expanded the use of plea bargains to
reduce caseload, and considered the possibility of referring cases
back to domestic jurisdictions. ln As ICTY President Claude Jorda
175. See, e.g., State Department oon Briefing, Richard BOllcher, State Deptartment
Spokesman (Jan. 28,2002), available at http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/
archi ves!2002/march/030 106.ht01I.
176. The prevalence of lower level indictees and detainees was largely the result of the
Tribunal's early prosecutorial strategy. At that time, the apprehension of higher level suspects was not possible, so then prosecutors Richard Goldstone and Louise Arbour focused
instead on lower level suspects who could be apprehended. See Interview with Richard
Goldstone, in Princeton, N.J. (Nov. 14,2003); David Sloss, Hard Nosed Idealism and US
IlUIl1Wl Rights Policy, 46 ST. LOUTS L.l431, 438 (2002).
In. Jorda July 2002 Address, supra note 122, at 30; Judge Claude Jot'da, Address to the
UN Securir\" Council, ICTY Press Release JDH/P.I.S./708-e (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter
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admitted as early as 2001, "The cases of lesser importance for the
Tribunal could, under certain conditions, be 'relocated', that is, tried
by the courts of the states created out of the former Yugoslavia ....
This solution would
considerably lighten ... the International
Tribunal's workload
" 178 But, Jorda cautioned, "for it to be possible to 'relocate' the cases ... the judicial systems of the states of
the fOTIner Yugoslavia must be reconstructed . . .. The national
courts must be in a position to accomplish their work with total independence and impartiality."179
With the international community's new goal for the ICTY to
complete its work in a tight timeframe, officials in the ICTY and Security Council member states recognized that the establishment of viable domestic institutions in BiB was a critical priority and that the
evaluation of their own perfonnance would turn, in pali, on the ability of domestic comis in BiB to undertake prosecutions of international crimes. With these newfound motivations, ICTY officials
quickly began to examine how domestic institutions in BiH could be
enhanced so as to relieve the ICTY of its hefty caseload.
Throughout late 200 I and early 2002, the possibility of and
prerequisites for transferring cases back to national jurisdictions was
considered at both the ICTY in The Hague and the OHR in Sarajevo. 180 A May 2002 report by a group of expert consultants 18\
(Consultants Report) evaluated the possibilities for domestic trials
and recommended "the establishment of an Intemational Humanitarian Law (IHL) Division within the Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina"
to be charged with "the prosecution of cases referred to Bosnia &
Herzegovina by the ICTY and investigation and proseclltion of lower
:evel offenders."182 The report provided the basis for the eventual
;)rganization of the war crimes chamber, calling for a trial chamber
consisting of three judges, one of whom would be international and

Jorda October 2002 Address]. For a discussion of plea bargaining, see Marlise Simons, Pleo
Deals Being Used to Cleor Balkall ~Var Trihunal's Docket, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at
A I: Michael Bohlander. Plea-Bargaining before the ICTY, in ES51\ YS ON ICTY PROCEDURE
AND EVIDr:\iCE IN HONOUR OF GI\f3RfELLE KIRK McDONALD lSI (Richard May. et al. cds.,

2001 ).
178. Judge Claude Jorda, /lddress to fhe UN Securitv Council, ICTY Press Release
:Nov. 7. 200 J ), JD/P.I.S./641-e [hereinafter Jorda November 200 I Address].
\79. See id.
180. Interview with David Tolben, ICTY Deputy Prosecutor, in The Hague.. lcth. (July

1,2005).
lSI. The consultants were Peter Bach (Den.), Kjell Bjolllberg (Swed.). John Ralston
Austl.) and Almiro Rodrigues (Pon.). See Consultants' RepOlt, supra notc 165. at 37. For
-n analysis of the report. see Michael Bohlander, The Transfer 0/ Cases jiml/ Illfernational
>iminal Trioul/ols {() Nariunal COllrfs, 14 CRrivl. L. FORuM 59 (2003 l.
182. Consultants' Report, sup/"([ notc 165, at 37.
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the others from different ethnic groups. 183 A special international
humanitarian law prosecutor's office was also proposed, with joint
domestic and foreign staff. 184 The plan further called for a public defense office and an international registry to manage the Court. 185
The Consultant's Report recognized the need for significant
modifications to domestic law and practice in Bosnia & Herzegovina
if the plan were to be realized. The report suggested a number of
new laws to be drafted with international assistance, including a new
criminal code, a code of criminal procedure, and a law on victim and
witness protection. I 86 All international aspects of the Court were to
be temporary, lasting for a period of four to five years to facilitate
training and implementation such that the Court would ultimately be
a purely national institution. 187
Drawing on this Consultant's Report, the final ICTY Completion Strategy presented to the Security Council in July 2002 included
explicit plans for vesting the CBiH with war crimes jurisdiction. 188
The plan noted, "of the approximately one hundred individuals to be
indicted by 2004, 50 might be tried by the courts of Bosnia & Herzegovina." 139 Yet, rCTY President Jorda observed, "despite the gradual re-establishment of democratic institutions and the return to peace
in the country, the local courts are still faced with significant structural difficulties.,,190 The best solution, determined during an early
summer 2002 visit of President Jorda and Prosecutor Del Ponte to
Sarajevo, was "establishing within the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina a Chamber with special jurisdiction to try serious violations

See id.
I84 Jd. annex 9.
[85
fd. at 19-20.
186. fd. annex 14.
187 See generally Consultants' Report, supra note 165, at 37. As the October 2004
Project Implementation Plan states, a "major objective of the Project is to introduce international professional support into the management and litigation functions of the Court and
Prosecutor's Office over the course of the five-year project .... The ultimate absorption of
War Crime Chamber's capacity into the justice system of Bosnia & Herzegovina and its national funding system is essential to the mandate of the project.'· See Project Implementation
Plan Progress Report. supra note 29, at 7.
188. Jorda July 2002 Address, supra note 122, at 30. Jorda observed the goal was to
"prosecute as a priority before the International Tribunal, those presumed responsible for
crimes which most seriously violate international public order and to give certain cases of
lesser :,ignificancc to the national coulis."
189 Jd.
IYO. Among the problems Jorda recognized were "the excessive compartmentalization
of the judicial systems of the Federation and Republika Srpska, the lack of cooperation between the t\VO entities, the political influence brought to bear on judges and prosecutors, the
often "mono-ethnic" composition of the local cOUlis, the difficulty of protecting the victims
and witnesses effectively, the court personnel's lack of training and the backlog of cases at
the courts." fc!.
I R3
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of international humanitarian law.,,191 The Security Council President immediately endorsed "the report's broad strategy for the transfer of cases involving intermediary and lower-level accused to competent national jurisdictions as likely to be in practice the best way of
allowing the ICTY to achieve its current objective of completing all
trial activities at first instance by 2008."192
This plan, and the pressures that gave rise to it, provided the
necessary international interests to complement the growing domestic
demand for the establishment of a federal level war crimes court in
Bosnia. International officials, like their domestic counterparts, now
had every reason to advocate for and assist with the development of
,-in effective domestic war crimes court in BiH. Likewise, they were
now operating under a jurisdictional relationship that could provide
selective incentives for domestic institutional development and sanction the failure of domestic institutions to meet internationally set
t:lrgets.
Norm Leadership and the Establishment of the State Court of
BiH
Once incentives and interests were aligned toward the devel~ rment and use of domestic judicial institutions in Bosnia, the actual
~stablishment of a war crimes chamber in the CBiR was driven by a
)rocess of norm leadership whereby inten1ational actors provided
I Jmestic institutions with norms, best practices, and even legislation
II guide the development of national institutions.
While the ICTY
i :ayed an important part in generating the norms adopted by BiH, the
If"ocess of norm leadership was spearheaded by a number of organittions, including the ICTY itself, the ORR in BiR, and the internaionalized registry within the newly created State Court. Simultaneusly, domestic officials looked to their international counterparts for
~adership and guidance, eagerly embracing the proffered norms
'om the international level of goven1ance in response to the incen191. The benefit of this approach is that, "aside from meaning that the lntemational Trimal could be relieved of a part of its caseload, this solution would guarantee that intcrna)flal humanitarian law was applied uniformly at the state level and address the issue of thc
paration of the two entities' judicial system." Id.
192. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/200212]
uly 23, 2002). The Security Council itself has made the call for transfer of cases a refrain
resolutions relating to the two tribunals. See S.C. Res. 1503, ~ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503
.ug. 23, 2003) (rcaffimling that the [CTY's goal should be "concentrating on the prosecuIII and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes
thin the ICTY's jurisdiction and transfclTing cases involving those who may not bear this
lel of responsibility to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, as well as the
cngthening of the capacity of such jurisdictions").
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tives provided by the jurisdictional relationship of Rule 11 his.
Recognizing the coalescence of domestic and international interests around the establishment of a new federal criminal court in
BiH, in May 2002, the Office of the High Representative established
a number of working groups on particular issues that would have to
be addressed for such a court to succeed. 193 ICTY officials actively
participated in many working group meetings, allowing the international tribunal to perform an important nonn-leadership role. 194 The
working groups' proposals and a package of necessary legislation195
were considered in two joint meetings between the OHR and the
ICTY in January and March 2003. 196 As the proposals were generally well received by all parties,197 the stage was set for the implementation of the project. These initial meetings facilitated deep and
lasting interactions between the ICTY, the OHR, and BiH officials,
which would eventually offer stnlcture, guidance, and support for the
establishment of the new court.
After joint approval of the proposals by the OHR and ICTY,
in June 2003 the OHR was given the institutional lead in project implementation. 198 OHR made clear that the project would only proceed if two years of funding were secured in advance. To that end,
donors' conferences were held during the summer of 2003 in Sarajevo and in October 2003 at the ICTy. 199 Approximately € 16 million was secured, with the United States providing just over half the
initial budget. 2oo While this was only a portion of the larger fiveyear proposed budget that had, by that time, expanded to €60 million,
193. The working groups were a multi-agency effort with representation from intemational institutions, NGOs, and officials from the govemment of Bil-1. The groups were responsible for issues such as legal reform, witness protection, building renovation, review of
cases. war crimes investigations, and staffing and training. These working groups included
representatives from the Ministry of Justice of BiH, the State Court. the ICTY Office of the
Prosecutor, the ICTY Chambers and the OSCE. among others. Id
194. See id. It is worth noting that the ICTY did not always have a common voice in the
process as OTP. Chambers and Registry often had different interests and provided sometimes-connicting advice in the process. Interview with Mechtild Lauth. Judicial Affairs Section Chief, CBiH, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug. 9. 2005).
195. The proposed legislation included a revised Law on the Coul1 of Bosnia & Herzegovina, a Law on the Office of the Prosecutor of BiH, a Law on Transfer of Cases, a Law on
the Protection of Victims and Witnesses, and a new Criminal Code. See id.
196. !d
197. In an inter-agency process the proposals were also shared with a number of other
institutions including international prosecutors and judges as well as thc Ministry of Justice
ofBiH. Id.
198 See id.
199. See id.
200. The US provided €7.959 million. Other major contributors included the United
Kingdom (€1.132 million), Germany (E1.7 million) and the Netherlands (EI million). Some
of these funds came in the forn1 of pledges that have yet to be paid. See Project 1mplementaticm Plan Progress Repo11. supra note 29. at 35.
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it was a sufficient for the OHR to proceed.
Thereafter, the package of legislation developed jointly by
Bosnian officials and international actors was sent to the Parliament
of BiH by way of the Ministry of Justice. Although, in 2000, the
High Representative used his plenary powers to impose the legislation establishing the CBiH, in 2004 he instead sent legislation for the
War Crimes Chamber through the BiH parliament so as to enhance
the legitimacy of the new war crimes chamber. 20l The new alignment of domestic interests in favor of a federal war crimes chamber
made the passage of that legislation possible. Six months of debate,
negotiation and amendment followed, with significant pressure from
the OHR, ICTY officials, and from Michael Johnson, the new international Registrar of the CBiH. 2 02 The final package of legislation,
including laws related to the structure of the war crimes chamber, the
operation of the prosecutor's office, and the transfer of cases from the
ICTY, was passed in November and December 2004. 203
Simultaneously, a new federal criminal code was enacted.
Drawing on international nOlms and precedents, the code incorporated the major international crimes of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.204 Chapter VII of the Bosnian Criminal

201. See Interview with Mechtild Lauth, supra note 194; Interview with John Peyton,
supra note 25. Over time the High Representative has tried to put more legislation through
standard domestic channels rather than use the power of imposition. OHR has indicated that
they believe even the initial legislation would have passed had it been sent through parliament, but that there was a desire to avoid a political confrontation with the Republika
Srpska.
202. See Interview with Mechtild Lauth, supra note 194. The High Representative provided significant pressure with respect to organized crime jurisdiction, which remained his
priority. Johnson, in contrast, pushed hard for the establishment of the war Climes chamber.
203. The package included three major laws. See Law on Amendments to the Law on
the Coul1 of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 35/04 (Bosn. & Herz.). This
law provided for the establishment of a special war crimes division within the CBiH. See
a/so Law on Transfer of Cases, supra note 157. The Law on Transfer of Cases allows for
cases to be transferred from the ICTY to the CBiH, gives the Prosecutor of BiH the power to
reform an ICTY indictment to bring it into conformity with Bosnian procedure and specified
that an accused's time in custody at the ICTY shall not count toward cuslOdiallimits of Bosnia law. In addition the law made clear that evidence gathered by the ICTY would be admissible before the CBiH and that facts established by legally binding decisions of the (CTY
shall be controlling in the CBiH. See a/so Law on Amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 35/04 (Bosn. & Herz.);
Law on Amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia & Herzogovina,
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BII-! 61/04 (Bosn. & Herz.). These two laws created a special war
crimes division within the Office of the Prosecutor of the CBill and provided for the appointment of international prosecutors during the transitional period.
204. See Criminal Code of Bosnia & I-lerzogovina ch. XVII, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 81H
3/03 (Bosn. & f1erz). For other relevant laws, sec Law on Amendments to the Criminal
Code of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 61/04 (Bosn. & Herz.). A nUlllber of other laws relevant to the establishment of the War Crimes chambers were also
passed, though they are of lesser importance. For a complete collection of legislation, see
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Code is modeled closely on the Rome Statute and specifies "Crimes
Against Humanity and Values Protected by International Law.,,205
Picking up where the ICTY Statute and Rome Statute of the ICC
leave off, the new Bosnian law also draws on ICTY case law to provide a far more specific definition of the constituent elements of international offenses. 206 Again this legislation was a joint effort of
domestic and international officials, who, respectively, offered and
embraced international norms and legal ntles regarding the prosecution of war crimes.
To facilitate the international elements of the CBiH, in December 2004 an agreement was reached between Bosnia & Herzegovina and the OHR on the establishment of an internationalized registry for the war crimes chamber. 207 While the CBiH itself is
domestic, the war crimes Registry is an international institution embedded in the Bosnian judiciary. For the four-year transitional period, the Registry was tasked with staff appointments, building management, and court operation. 208 On May 1, 2005, the High
Representative appointed the first international judges and the new
Court was ready to begin operations. 209
The Court is specifically designed to promote the quality of
long-term capacity building in BiH. During the transition period, the
Court operates as a hybrid tribunal with a mandate not only of prosecution but also "to empower the people and institutions of Bosnia &
Herzegovina with the necessary management and technical tools and
financial and material resources ... to carry out the task of bringing
to justice perpetrators of crimes.,,210 The goal again is for the interBENCH BOOK OF THE COCRT OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA (2005 ed.) (on file with author).
205. Criminal Code of Bosnia & Herzogovina ch. XVll, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BI H 3/03
(Bosn. & Herz.). Officials involved in the drafting process note that both the ICTY Statute
and the Rome Statue were instrumental in shaping the intemational criminal law provisions
of the new criminal code. Interview with Almiro Rodrigues, Judge, Court of Bosnia &
Herzogovina, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug. 5, 2005, Aug. 8, 200S).
206 For example, aI1icle 172 of the Criminal Code provides detailed definitions of key
elements including attack directed against any civilian population, extemlination, deportation, and t0l1ure. See Criminal Code of Bosnia & Herzogovina, supra note 204, at art. 172.
207. See Agreement between the High Representative for BiH and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Establishment of the Registry for Section I for War Crimes and Section II for
Organized Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Criminal and Appellate Division
of the Court of BiH and the Special Department for War Crimes and the Special Department
for Organized Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia
& Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 16/02, International Agreemcnts 11104 (Bosn. &
Herz.).
208. See id. ans. 2,4. For a detailed explanation of the "vork of the Registry to date, see
Project Implementation Plan Progress Repon, supra note 29; Open Letter from Michael
Johnson (June 22, 2005) (on file with author).
209. See Open Letter from Michael Johnson, supra note 208.
210. Project Implementation Plan Progress Repon, silpra note 29. at 4.
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national element of the court to offer norms and best practices, which
their domestic colleagues can adopt. Once that judicial transplant is
accomplished, the international elements of the court can be withdrawn.
The largest international component of the coun is the Registry, responsible for the court's infrastructure, organization, and premises, as well as legal support. As an internationalized component of
the CBiH, the Registry performs dual functions, both overseeing the
Court's administration and leading international norms for other elements of the court to adopt. To date, the Registry has undertaken
numerous improvements to the Court's physical plant likely to be of
lasting benefit, including refurbishing the entire court building 211 and
constnlcting a detention center. 212 It has also developed state-of-theart technology for each courtroom and a data management system. 213
In addition, the Registry has conducted both international and domestic outreach. 2l4 So far 110 journalists have been accredited to the
court, sixty NGOs have been involved in consultations, and meetings
have been held with key constituencies across the country.215 Finally, the Registry is training national personnel to take over standard
duties of security, victim and witness protection, and budgeting. 216
Most elements of the COUli have been internationalized such
that an international structure parallels the domestic one with the intcnt that, over time, the international structure can be withdrawn and
tasks handed across to functionally identical national personnel who
are already in place. Each of the two internationalized trial chambers
consists of two international and one Bosnian judge. An international Judicial Support Section Chief, backed by a domestic counterpart, supports the entire trial division. 217 The Court also includes an
appeals chamber, with review power on questions of fact and law,
comprised of three international and two Bosnianjudges.21 8
The Office of the Prosecutor of the CBiH War Crimes Section
211. Project Implementation Plan Progress Report, supra note 29, at 49-52.
212. See Open Letter from Michael Johnson, supra note 208.
213. This analysis is based on personal observations of the courtroom technology in
August 2005.
214. Interview with Refik Hodzic, supra note 160.
215. See Open Letter from Michael Johnson, supra note 208.
216. Interview with Michael Johnson, Registrar of the CBiH, in Sarajevo, Bosn. &
Herz. (Aug. 4, 2005).
217. See also Project Implementation Plan Progress Report, supra note 29; Interview
with Mechtild Lauth, supra note 194.
218. Law on the Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina art. I S, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH
29/00 (Bosn. & Herz.). The appellate division is supported by a legal officer (Bosnian), two
interpreters (both Bosnian), two law clerks (one international and one Bosnian), and two interns (one intemational and one Bosnian). Project Implementation Plan Progress Rep0l1,
supra note 29. at 42.
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is also designed to encourage capacity building and transfer of best
practices from the ICTY. The office consists of five mixed national
and international trial teams assigned to different geographical areas. 2l9 A national Head of Administration and support staff backs
the teams. 220 In addition, the Prosecutor's Office has a designated
liaison, responsible for cooperation with the ICTY and with other
States in the region.22I The prosecutorial teams are currently reviewing more than 8,000 cases for which files already exist and the first
indictment was handed down in the Simsic Case in June 2005. 222 As
ICTY 11 his referrals are finalized, the CBiH Prosecutor's office
works with the ICTY to make those indictments compatible with
Bosnian law and formally issue them. Again, the structure is designed to allow incorporation of international practices into the domestic prosecutor's office.
On the criminal defense side, the CBiH has sought to build
the capacity and skills of Bosnian lawyers and socialize them with international norms. The Criminal Defense Section (Odsjek Krivicne
Odbrane - OKO), initially under temporary international leadership,223 has trained Bosnian lawyers in criminal defense and international law,224 assisted with the transition to an adversarial judicial
model, and developed an accreditation program for Bosnian lawyers. 225 Again, ICTY officials have reached out to assist with training and support. Defense before the CBiH is conducted solely by
Bosnian-trained lawyers, who are supported by geographically organ219. Each team includes a head domestic prosecutor, an international prosecutor, a national investigator, two legal associates (one national and one international) and a national
case coordinator. See Project Implementation Plan Progress Report, supra note 29, at 53.
The geographic regions are Northwest BiH, Central Bosnia, Eastern Bosnia, Sarajevo and
Eastern Herzegovina, and Neretva and Western Herzegovina.
220. The staff presently includes four data management and trial support staff (two of
whom are international) as well as five national interpreters. See id.
221. Interview with Ramiz Huremagic, Deputy Prosecutor of Bosnia & Herzegovina, in
Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz., (Aug. 8, 2005).
222. Indictment of June 28. 2005, Prosecutor v. Boban, Case No. KT-RZ-2/05 (CL of
Bosn. & l-Icrz. 2005).
223. OKO is under the stewardship of Rupert Skilbeck, a British barrister from 36 Bedford Row Chambers for a six month to one year initial term. Skilbeck was previously detense advisor for the Special COllrt in Sierra Leone. He is author of Rupert Skilbeck, Build-

ing the Fourth Pillar:

Delense Rights at the SjJecial Court for Sierra Leone, I

ESSEX

REVIEW 66 (2004), available at http://projects.essex.ac.uk/EHRR/archive/
pdf/54.pdf. Interview with Rupert Skilbcck, supra note 28.
224. Dctailed training modules have been developed and local Bosnian experts have
been employed to run the training sessions themselves. Interview with Ruper1 Skilbeck, supra note 28.
225. Ie/. Accreditation requires either that lawyers have tried a serious criminal case before the CBiH or more than two such cases at thc cantonal or district level or that the attorneys attend a 100 hours of training sponsored by OKO. In addition, annual continued legal
education credits are to be implementcd.
HUMAN RleJHTS
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ized defense assistance teams at OKO.226
Throughout the development of the CBiH, ICTY officials
have sought promote the adoption of international norms in domestic
practice. Specifically, the ICTY has provided judges, legal assistance, and training for the CBiH. Pursuant to a 24 January 2003
amendment to the Law on the Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, for a
four year transitional period as many as six of the court's fifteen
judges may be international. 227 One of the first international judges,
the Portuguese jurist, Almiro Rodrigues, is a former ICTY judge. He
has served as a norm entrepreneur in the War Crimes Chamber. 228 In
fact, while at the ICTY, Judge Rodrigues himself confirmed many of
the indictments that are now being referred back to the CBiH. He
commented: "having confirmed these indictments I am very familiar
with the law and even the facts of these cases. I am sharing that
knowledge and making sure that the trials here meet the same standards they would at the ICTy.,,229 Personnel exchange at lower levels is also frequent. For example, two of the junior staff members at
the OKO Defense Assistance Office are former ICTY employees or
interns. 23o
The ICTY has also helped facilitate a number of training sessions for officials of the CBiH as well as entity level judges and
prosecutors that have helped embed intenlational norms at the domestic level. Though the ICTY lacks the resources to organize these
trainings (often referred to as consultations) directly, it recognizes
their importance and participates actively in them. 231 For example,
in July 2005, a delegation of judges and prosecutors from Sarajevo
visited The Hague for discussions with their international counter-

226. Attomeys must be a current member of either the bar association of the RS or
FBiH, have expel1ise in the relevant areas of law, and completed sufficient continuing professional training. See Additional Rules of Procedure for Defense Advocates Appearing before Section 1 For War Crimes and Section II for Organized Crime, Economic Crime and
COlTuption of the Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina, Odsjek Krivicne Odbranc, Sarajevo (on
file with the author).
227. The law provides that "[d]uring a transitional period, a maximum number of six (6)
international judges may be appointed to the Special Panels for Organized Crime, Economic
Crime and C01Tuption within the Criminal and Appellate Division. International judges
shall not be citizens of Bosnia & Herzegovina or of any neighboring state. The transitional
period shall last not more than four years." See Law Re-amending the Law on the Court of
Bosnia & Herzegovina art. 12, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 42/03 (Bosn. & Herz.).
228. See Interview with Biljana Potparic-Lipa, supra note 99. She noted that having
"the international judges present helps our understanding of international criminal law, gives
us more confidence, and allows our decisions to have an international character, while we
can remain filTnly a domestic coul1. This is a good thing for the transitional period."
229. Interview with Almiro Rodrigues, supra note 205.
230. See [ntcrview with Rupert Skilbeck, supra notc 28.
231. See Interview with Matais Hellman. supra note 107.
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parts. 232 Throughout the spring of 2005, the CBiH hosted judicial
and prosecutorial training sessions on international criminal law and
criminal procedure with ICTY involvement,233 High-level delegations from the ICTY participated in trainings and consultations in Sarajevo, Mostar, Zagreb, and Belgrade during 2004. 234 These sessions
have again promoted the exchange of expertise and knowledge, allowing norm leadership from international to domestic institutions.
The ICTY has also taken part in a number of public events
that have directly sought to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the
new Court. For example, on March 9, 2005 the War Crimes Chamber of the CBiH was formally inaugurated in an event that brought
ICTY President Theodore Meron and ICTY Prosecutor Carla del
Ponte together with CBiH President Madzida Kreso, CBiH Chief
Prosecutor Marinko Jurcevic, and CBiH Minister of Justice Slobodan
Kovac. 235 The event provided an opportunity both to raise the profile
of the new court and to allow exchange of information and experience between ICTY officials and their domestic counterparts.
In the development of the CBiH, Bosnian officials have also
sought to embrace, where possible, the work and experience of the
ICTY. The library of the CBiH includes a complete collection of the
ICTY's jurispnldence236 and all of the judges in the War Crimes
Chamber have been briefed on that jurisprudence. 237 CBiH Judge
Almiro Rodrigues commented that "the ICTY's jurisprudence will
have a profound effect on us. Though it is persuasive rather than
bjndil1~, it provides the critical foundation on which we will
build."",38 The rCTY's jurisprudence and past investigative work
should have a significant impact both on the indictments the Bosnian
prosecutor decides to bring and on the case law of the CBiH itself.
This judicial dialogue is likely to help preserve the uniformity of the
two tribunals' jurisprudence, while avoiding the potential dangers of
inconsistent holdings and legal fragmentation. 239
232.. See Interview with David Tolbeli, supra note 81.
2.33. Interview with Almiro Rodrigues, supra note 205.
234. See Interview with Matais Hellman, supra note 107. These training sessions were
often linked to the ICTY's "Bridging the Gap Program" through which prosecutors came to
Bosnia to share their work with affected communities. See ICTY, Bridging the Gap Between the ICTY and Communities in Bosnia & Herzogovina, Program CD, Oct. 9,2004, (on
fi Ie with author).
235. See Open Letter from Michael Johnson, supra note 208.
2.36. Interview with Mirela Mehic, Librarian, Court of Bosnia & Herzogovina, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug. 8, 2005). The library is housed in a local computer database to
t~lcilitate ease of access even iflntemet connections are not reliable. Id.
2.3 7. Interview with Almiro Rodrigues, supra note 205.
2.38. Id.
239. For a discussion of the dangers of legal fragmentation and the ways in which an
inter-judicial dialogue can preserve uniformity. see William W. Burke-White, fnfernarional
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After its establishment, the CBiH has continued to draw on
norms developed by the ICTY in its own jurispnldence and practice,
despite differences in the applicable law before the two tribunals. 240
The CBiH applies the Criminal Code of Bosnia & Herzegovina with
respect to violations of federal law and cannot apply international law
directly.241 Yet, the CBiH can accept facts established by legally
binding decisions of the ICTy. 242 In addition, evidence collected by
the ICTY and the statements of witnesses before the ICTY are admissible in proceedings before the CBiH.243 This unique legal relationship allows ICTY decisions to have direct impact in the CBiH.
Although the jurisprudence of the ICTY is not formally binding on the comis of Bosnia & Herzegovina, it has already proven to
be an important authority before domestic courts. The first war
crimes trial before the CBiH was the prosecution of Iraqi-born Abduladhim Maktouf for war crimes involving the abduction of civilians
in 1993. 244 Although the trial proceeded before the Organized Crime
Chamber, rather than the War Crimes Chamber, ICTY jurisprudence
was instrumental in the Court's analysis and Maktufs eventual conviction. 245 For example, the CBiH accepted the ICTY's determination that the conflict in the Balkans was of an international character,
citing to the ICTY's Blaskic Case and Kordic & Cerkez Case. In addition, the Court relied heavily on evidence presented in trials before
the ICTY in finding Maktouf guilty of violations of the Geneva ConLegal Pluralism, 25 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 963,971 (2004) ("This dialogue has important implications for the unity of the international legal order as it provides actors at all levels with
means to communicate, share information, and possibly resolve potential conflicts before
they even occur").
240. The ICTY applies international law, as specified in its statute, and only looks to
domestic law in "determining the terms of imprisonment."
See STATUTE OF THE
[NTERNA TIO~AL CRIMI, AL TRIBU'JAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA arts. 1-5, 24, May 25,
1993. In contrast, courts in Bosnia & Herzegovina apply a number of different legal instruments, all of which derive from the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. See Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF SFRJ 44/76 (Yugo.). Cantonal courts in the FBiH apply thc Federation Penal
Code; district couris in the RS apply the Serb Penal Code; and the CBiH applies a federal
penal code. The relevant instruments are Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia &
Herzogovina, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BIH 3/03 (Bosn. & Herz.); and Criminal Code of the
Republika Srpska, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE RS 49/03 (Bosn. & Herz.). In addition, the
semi-independent Brcko District applies the Criminal Code of the Brcko District, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF THE BRCKO DISTRICT, 10/03 (Bosn. & Herz.).
241. See Law on the COLlli of Bosnia & Herzogovina, OITrCIAL GAZETTE OF BrH 16/02
arts. 13-15,34 (Bosn. & Herz.).
242. Law on Transfer of Cases, supra note 157, ari. 4.
243. Id. aliso 3, 5.
244. Prosecutor v. Maktuf, Case No. K-I27/04, Verdict of July 1,2005 (Ct. of Bosn &
Herz. 2005).
245. The case began as an organized crime case, but due to the insufficiency of evidence
on organized crime charges, Maktuf was convicted of war crimes for which there was better
:.
evidence.
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ventions. 246
Beyond jurispnldential references, nonns developed in the
ICTY Office of the Prosecutor have shaped the fonn and substance
of indictments at the domestic level. As pa11 of its Completion Strategy, the ICTY is making available to domestic authorities its investigation files in a number of cases that never reached trial in The
Hague. 24 7 Though there are often delays in the delivery of this material, it is serving as the basis for indictments in cases before the
CBiH. 24 8 For example, the first indictment issued by the War Crimes
Chamber against Boban Simsic is, in part, based on a file transferred
from the ICTy. 24 9 The indictment, which charges Simsic with war
crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated against the civilian
population in Visegrad in 1992, relies explicitly on ICTY jurisprudence, especially the ICTY Vasiljevic Case. 250
In all aspects of its creation, the CBiH has sought to borrow
the nonns, procedures, and best practices of international institutions
specifically so as to meet the standards for referral of cases back from
the ICTY discussed above. Each element of the Court-from the applicable law to the structure of the prosecutor's office, and from the
criminal defense section to the infonnation technology unit-closely
parallels the requirements set forth in the ICTY Comrletion Strategy
and the early decisions of the ICTY Referral Beneh. 2 1 International
actors, whether in the ICTY itself, the Office of the High Representative or the internationalized Registry of the CBiH have actively
sought to promote the adoption of such norms into the CBiH practice.
The result has been a clear incorporation of international standards
for a high quality justice system. The new CBiH is thus a product of
the norms led by the international community, the incentives flowing
from a jurisdictional relationship similar to complementarity under
Rule 11 bis, and the self-interested motivation of actors within the
ICTY and the goven1ment of BiH.
246. For example, the statement of witness Dalibor Adzaip, used in the trial, was given
at a trial before the ICTY on Sept. 7, 2004. See Prosecutor v. Maktuf, Case o. K-I27/04,
Verdict of July 1,2005 (Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. 2005). Such admission of witness statements
and evidence from the rCTY was allowed by article 5 of the Law on Transfer of Cases, supronate 157.
247. Interview with David Tolbert, ICTY Deputy Prosecutor, in The Hague, Neth. (July
I, 2005). A special team has been established for this purpose. Law on Transfer of Cases.
supra note 157.
24R. Interview with Ramiz Huremagic, Deputy Prosecutor of Bosnia & Herzogovina, in
Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Aug. X. 2005).
249. Id
250. Prosecutor v. Boban. Case :';0. KT-RZ-2/05, Indictment of June 28, 2005 at II (Ct.
of Bosn. & Herz. 2005). The cited ICTY case is Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic. Case No. IT-9832-T, Judgment (Nov. 29, 2002)
251. See supra text accompunying notes 135-136.
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CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND THE DOMESTIC
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

The interactions between the ICTY and the institutions of
Bosnia & Herzegovina between 1993 and 2007, and particularly the
creation of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, illustrate three
significant points. First, despite criticism of its lack of domestic impact, the ICTY has had significant influence on BiH, far beyond deten-ing international crimes. In fact, the ICTY has deeply affected
the structure and operation of domestic judicial institutions in BiH.
Second, a theoretical model based on the incentives created by the jurisdictional relationship between international and domestic institutions, the pursuit of self-interest by domestic and international actors,
and norm leadership by international institutions goes far to explain
how an international criminal tribunal can affect core domestic governance choices, such as the creation and activation of a criminal justice mechanism. Third, the nature of the jurisdictional relationship
between domestic and international courts is a key factor in explaining the variance in the direction and intensity of an inten1ational
criminal tribunal's domestic impact. In short, the design of international criminal tribunals and, particularly, their jurisdictional relationship with national courts matters.
While the ICTY has been broadly criticized for its limited or
even its (early) counterproductive impact on domestic judicial development in the Balkans, the Tribunal's interactions with Bosnia,
documented here, demonstrate that it has actually exercised considerable domestic influence. From the normative perspective of postconflict reconstnlction, that influence was, at least initially, not always positive. During the first phase of the Tribunal's operation, the
jurisdictional relationship of absolute international primacy under the
Rules of the Road program compounded the lack of domestic or international interests in a strengthened domestic judiciary and presented a significant barrier to the consolidation and activation of
Bosnian courts. However, a subsequent adjustment to the jurisdictional relationship accomplished by Rule 11 bis creatcd incentives
similar to complementarity. These new incentives reinforced a growing domestic demand for federal criminal prosecutions and served as
a strong catalyst for the development and use of the Bosnian judiciary to prosecute international crimes. The net result was the cstablishment of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina with war
crimes jurisdiction. That court might never have been created and
certainly would not have taken its particular form, but for the influences of the ICTY and its altered jurisdictional relationship under the
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Completion Strategy.
The CBiH, which was the primary result of the ICTY's catalytic impact in Bosnia, is certainly not without its own problems.
The infrastructw'e of the Comi is not complete and there are no federal level detention centers as yet. 252 Until a federal level prison is
operational, incarceration of convicts will remain a significant concern. The skills and training of domestic personnel are questionable
and further training is needed. 253 Equality of anns presents a serious
concem 254 and, despite the efforts of OKO, it is uncertain whether an
adequate defense can be offered. 255 Funding for the CBiH is likewise an ever-present issue 256 and a considerable forti on of pledged
funds have not been received from donor states. 25 Yet despite these
challenges, the new court is already contributing to accountability in
the Balkans and offers real promise to help end impunity in the region. It has already convicted more than seven accused for war
crimes and crimes against humanity as well as a number of other indictees for organized crime offenses. 258

252. Until the proposed federal prison is built, anyone convicted by the CBiH would
have to serve his/her sentence in an FBiH or RS prison. These prisons arc notoriously poor
and raise serious dangers of ethnic bias. Rupert Skilbeck referenced serious detention problems. See Interview with Ruperi Skilbeck, supra note 28. Construction of a federal prison
for the State Court is now underway, with the cornerstone laid in August 2006. See Press
Release, The Cornerstone Ceremony Inaugurating the Construction of the BiH Prison was
held Today (Aug. 12, 2006), http://www.sudbih.gov.banid=51&jezik=e.
253. Although many have lauded the quality of Bosnian lawyers, see, e.g., Interview
with Dan Beckwith, supra note 103, the transition to the adversarial system has not been
easy and few have relevant war crimes prosecution experience. See Interview with Rupeli
Skilbeck, supra note 28.
254. For a discussion of equality of am1S problems in other hybrid courts, see BurkeWhite, supra note 239, at 65-71.
255. Equality of Anus is guaranteed in the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Aug. I,
2003 art. 14, (Bosn. & Herz.). But, aKa's budget is less than one third of that for the international staff at the CBiH Office of the Prosecutor alone. Interview with Ruperi Skilbeck,
supra note 28. Moreover, the structure of defense payments in Bosnia is nowhere near that
of the ICTY, meaning that there is likely to be a significant decline in defense resources
when cases arc trans felTed. No funding is available for defense investigation. Defense lawyers are not paid for pretrial work, offering no incentives for pretrial motions but instead to
argue such issues during the trial itself, thereby delaying proceedings. Id.
256. While the Court is far less expensive than the ICTY, its costs are likely beyond the
resources of the Bosnian domestic budget. For example, the five year proposed budget for
the CBi H of €60 million is less than six months of the ICTY operating budget, which regularly runs to more than €100 million annually. For the complete budget proposals for the
CBiH, see Project Implementation Plan Progress Report, supra note 29.
257. Interview with Michael Johnson, supra note 216. Of particular concern to many
officials at the CBiH is the fact that, while the I(TY has handed off a portion of its caseload
equivalent to approximately two years of trials, it has provided no direct financial contribution to the Bosnian court. ILl.
258. See Prcss Release, Ct. Bosn. & Herz., Niset Ramie Convicted of War Crimes
against Civilians and Sentenced to 30 Years Long TenTI Imprisonment (July 17, 2007),
http://www.suclbih.gov.baf'?id=457&jezik=e; Press Release, Ct. Bosn. & Herz., Goran and
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The evidence of the ICTY's impact on domestic judicial development in Bosnia not only challenges the conventional wisdom
about the ICTY's domestic influence, but also suggests a new way of
thinking about the role and function of international criminal tribunals. To the degree that such tribunals are embedded in a global governance structure along with national courts, their jurisdictional relationship with domestic institutions may allow them to monitor,
sanction, and provide benefits directly to national governments with
respect to not just substantive nOlms of international criminal law,
but also to the very stnlcture and function of domestic judiciaries.
While this role of an international tribunal is rooted in basic institutionalist theory, the global governance architecture allows an international criminal tribunal to wield broader influences on domestic outcomes by directly altering the incentive structures for national
officials and domestic institutions. Where the preferences of domestic actors align with the incentives created by that jurisdictional relationship, the result can be a profound influence on the development,
use and functioning of domestic judicial institutions.
The model suggested in Part II provides such a theoretical account of how an international criminal tribunal, embedded in a stnlcture of multilevel global governance, can more broadly influence the
structure and function of domestic institutions based on the relative
jurisdictional competencies of national and international courts. In
this model, the international tribunal uses the suasion created by its
jurisdictional relationship to alter the incentives for national actors,
who, in tum, pursue their own self-interests, taking into account the:
new incentive structures. As a result, those officials may create new
domestic institutions or change the operation of existing institutions,
including the national judiciary. Finally, processes of norm leadership allow for the transmission of international best practices, policies, and legal nl1es from an international tribunal to domestic institutions. The model, born out by the ICTY's impact in BiH, provides a
coherent account of the impact of the ICTY on domestic judicial development in Bosnia.
More broadly, the jurisdictional relationship between the
Zoran Damjanovic Convicted of War Crimes against Civilians (June 18, :2007),
http://www.sudbih.gov.baf'Jid=436&jezik=e; Press Release, Ct. Bosn. & Herz., Radmilo
Vukovic
Convicted
of War
Crimes
against
Civilians
(Apr.
16,
2007),
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?id=406&jezik=e; Press Release, Ct. Bosn. & Herz., Marko
SamardZija Convicted and Sentenced to 26 Years Imprisonment (Mar. 11, 2006).
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?id=269&jezik=e; Press Release, Ct. Bosn. & Herz., Nikola
Kovacevic Convicted and Sentenced to 12 Years Imprisonment (Mar. 11, 2006),
http://www.sudbih.gov.baf.Jid=268&jczik=c;PressRelease.Cl. Bosn. & Herz.. Ncdo
Samardiic Found Guilty and Sentenced to 13 Years and 4 Months Imprisonment (Apr. 7,
2006), http://www.sudbih.gov.baf?id'=133&jezik=e.

348

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[46:279

ICTY and the institutions of Bosnia & Herzegovina helps explain the
variation in the ICTY's domestic influence over time. The pronounced shift from the ICTY's chilling effect on the exercise of domestic jurisdiction in Bosnia during its first phase into a catalytic effect during the second phase of its operation is due both to changes in
the nature of the jurisdictional relationship and shifts in the preferences of domestic and international actors. A jurisdictional relationship of absolute international primacy generated strong disincentives
for either domestic or international officials to empower and activate
national institutions. In contrast, a jurisdictional relationship closer
to complementarity provided significant incentives for those same actors, whose own preferences were shifting simultaneously due to exogenous domestic factors, to catalyze domestic judicial development
and uti lize national courts to prosecute war crimes.
The importance of the structure of the jurisdictional relationship on the direction and intensity of the domestic impact of the
ICTY underscores the significance of the institutional design of international criminal tribunals and has implications that reach far beyond the work of the ICTY. A jurisdictional relationship akin to
complementarity alone may not lead to domestic institutional development such as the creation of the State Court in Bosnia. The interests of both international and domestic officials were critical factors.
But, the nature of the jurisdictional relationship, and to some degree
the interests of international officials, are within the control of the
diplomats and lawyers who create and operate international criminal
tribunals. To the extent the international community seeks to use international courts to promote domestic institutional development, it
must strategically design such tribunals so that they are both embedded in a common system of governance with domestic institutions
and generate strategic incentives for the development and activation
of domestic judiciaries. The evidence provided here and the early
examples of the operation of the ICC in the Democratic Republic of
Cong0 259 indicate that governance relationships of complementarity,
or that create incentives similar to complementarity, as is the case
with Rule 11 bis, are most likely to promote the consolidation and activation of domestic judiciaries in weak or post-conflict states. The
design choices made by those lawyers and diplomats in the international court will then shape the incentives of domestic and international actors pursuing their own self-interest and may ultimately influence their policy choices in favor of reform and activation of
domestic criminal courts.
259. See generally Burke-White, supra note 8 (discussing the impact of the International
Criminal C01ll1 in the Democratic Republic of Congo).
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For the lawyers and diplomats creating new international
criminal tribunals, one lesson is clear: a jurisdictional relationship of
complementarity, or something close to it, will in most cases be a far
more effective way of promoting domestic judicial development than
would a relationship of international primacy or absolute international primacy.260 For already existent international criminal tribunals, such as the ICC, the experience of the ICTY in BiB offers
strategies for how such tribunals can use their complementary jurisdiction more effectively to promote the efficient functioning of national courts. 261 International officials in other tribunals such as the
ICC need to recognize that the nature of their tribunals' jurisdiction
and their policy choices with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction
have the potential to directly influence f1.111damental goven1ance
choices of the states in which they operate. To the degree the ICC,
which has complementary jurisdiction, seeks to promote the activation of international coulis, at least in cases involving international
crimes, ICC officials ought to use their ability to monitor, sanction,
and provide benefits to national governments as a tool of leverage to
catalyze domestic judiciaries.
While the ability of international criminal tribunals to directly
monitor and sanction the conduct of national govemments, documented herein, gives such tribunals considerable influence over national governments, officials within such tribunals must still recognize their own limitations. The positive story of the ICTY's eventual
impact in BiH would not have been possible but for a fundamental
change in the perceived interests of domestic actors in Bosnian society. International criminal tribunals may be able to change how those
interests are articulated by structuring the incentives domestic actors
face through the strategic use of the tribunals' jurisdictional entitlements. Ultimately, however, the domestic interests of national officials are an exogenous variable, to which international tribunals will
have to respond. Such officials will have to look for opportunities in
an ever changing domestic political landscape and identify the right
times and situations in which their policy choices may be best able to
structure the incentives of domestic actors toward prefelTed outcomes, such as the development of a more robust and active national

260. This is not to say that complemcntarity will always be the best Jurisdictional relationship. Other goals, such as avoiding biased domestic prosecutions, may at times take
precedence over encouraging domestic institutional development. Over time. however, priorities may change and international criminal tribunals may be well served by modifying
their jurisdictional relationships with national govemments toward relationships such as
complementarity that are more likely to facilitate domestic judicial development.
261. For a broader discussion of how the ICC can more etlectively use complementarity
to promote domestic judicial development, see Burke- White, supra note 72.
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court system.
In short, the story of the ICTY's role in BiH and the establishment of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina provides compelling evidence that the institutional design and jurisdictional relationships of international tribunals are powerful means through which
international actors may be able to influence domestic policy outcomes. While there are certainly limits to that power, international
criminal tribunals, if properly designed and operated, have the potential to playa significant role in post-conflict reconstruction and national institutional development that goes far beyond mere retribution
and detelTence.

